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This master’s thesis critically addresses the legality of armed interventions by states, who, 
for the most part, defend their actions based on authority from the UN in the form of UN 
Resolutions. This thesis also investigates, in particular, uses of force that lack a clear legal 
authority. It then explores the issue of legitimate, that is, justifiable, uses of force as part of 
the decentralised system of international law enforcement.  
The issue that is discussed considers whether an ‘illegal’ opposition force can in fact have 
some legitimacy. That is, can a use of force be justified even though it stretches the 
boundaries of international law, in particular an enabling UNSC Resolution. 
The predominant justification that is analysed is the role of humanitarian intervention. The 
legitimacy of this doctrine is evaluated through its positive and negative aspects. 
This thesis considers the aforementioned issues both in general terms, and with respect to 
UN Resolutions against Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya treated as case studies. The evaluation 
of these studies adds to and detracts from the legitimacy of armed intervention. 
Finally, my thesis makes various suggestions for reform of this system with respect to a 
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This thesis is concerned with the use of force by states in response to aggression from 
another state. It will consider states uses of force in situations where the action is beyond 
that permitted by the Security Council. It will examine in detail the force used by a ‘coalition 
of willing’ states against Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, and question whether the action was 
strictly legal.  
At the time this thesis was due to be presented, the issue of legality versus legitimacy once 
again came to the fore. There is presently a use of force in Syria to counter ISIL forces 
without UNSC authorisation. The US and UK are particularly keen to stress a legal right to 
use force based on self-defence. This claim of self-defence is founded upon the threat to 
Iraq. The inherent right of self-defence is unquestionable; however, it is questionable 
whether this right extends to striking targets inside Syria in order to defend Iraq. 
This thesis will thus consider that if a use of force is illegal in international law, can this use 
of force can still have legitimacy - that is ‘able to be defended with reasoning’.1  Did the use 
of force that was illegal have a justifiable reason for being used?  
Legitimacy would suggest that certain uses of forces can be justified in particular 
circumstances. It is therefore a concept which shares a realist perspective. Arguably 
legitimacy in the international sphere is concerned with what states regard as appropriate 
conduct. This is a subjective test based on the views and attitudes of states. It is related to 
the value patterns of states and hence their subsequent actions.2 This would bring together 
the fact that international treaty law is both written and adhered to by states; customary 
international law is also a product of established state practice. There is no separation of the 
powers. Thus only states can provide “legitimacy” for a breach of international law. 
Importantly, ‘legitimacy does not necessarily equal legality.’3 This will be discussed further 
throughout this thesis. 
                                                          
1 Oxford English Dictionary 9th edition. 
2
 Peter G Stillman, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy’, [1974] 7 Polity 32, 42. Stillman refers to legitimacy being the ‘objective compatibility 
between the value patterns of the relevant systems and the results of governmental output.’ However, legitimacy in the sense of state 
patterns and subsequent output is more subjective. 
3 ibid 34. 
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The issue of “legitimacy” will be discussed in terms of the claimed need for armed 
intervention when current international law is insufficient and as such cannot provide an 
excuse for the action. Such a discussion is vital, because, as Wheeler claims: ‘there are few 
works that explicitly interrogate the idea of legitimacy at the international level. The reason 
for this neglect is the general acceptance of the assumption that the international realm is 
governed by considerations of power and not legitimacy.’4 At this point it is important to 
note that legitimacy is based on what the majority view as legitimate or justifiable 
behaviour. It would not always be possible to gain a unanimous consensus. This is 
particularly true where an aggressor state is involved and does not believe that retaliation is 
just. For example, in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait believing that Kuwait had stolen 
petroleum and furthermore, that Kuwait was actually a province of Iraq; Iraq would be 
unlikely to consider the use of force justifiable in repelling their troops. 
The imbalance of states power will be considered in the opening chapter by means of a 
discussion of the different schools of thought in international law. Realists, for example, 
consider ‘power politics’ to be at the forefront of international relations. On the other hand, 
strict positivists will question the relevance and role of ‘power politics’ within strictly legal 
analysis and dictate that the law is only that stated as such.  
A literature review will be used to address the schools of thought on international law; to 
examine current thoughts on States use of force in interstate hostility and how questions of 
legitimacy may arise with respect to such use.  
In terms of methodology, the following chapters will consider the international law on 
armed force initially from a legalistic approach, moving onto contextual approaches. Once 
the doctrinal framework is discussed, the fourth chapter will consider legitimate 
justifications for those uses of force which cannot be termed as ‘strictly legal.’ These 
particular methodologies have been chosen as they best exemplify how a use of force that 
could be considered by some to be illegal may be considered justifiable or legitimate in the 
same circumstances by another. The final chapter will conclude the thesis, incorporating 
broad reforms.  
                                                          
4 Nicholas  J Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford University Press 2000) 4. 
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The use of ‘illegal’ force in the case-studies to be considered stems from the inherent 
problems concerned with the authorisation to use force under Chapter VII UN Charter. The 
UN can only authorise the use of force, it is not able to enforce its will. ‘Reliance has to be 
placed on consent, consensus, reciprocity and good faith.’5 The Charter system is also 
restricted by: the veto, the inability to establish formal mechanisms for collective action, 
and the rejection of limited collective security.6 Thus it is the responsibility of states to 
develop international law. This is reflected in the way that states typically engage in the use 
of force when they have a concrete interest in the aggressor state(s) involved. Brunnee and 
Toope reiterate this in a harsher context emphasised by realist analysis: ‘the constant abuse 
of [international] law is served up to suggest that international law is fundamentally flawed, 
that it can never be more than a mask for power relationships.’7 A key issue is whether this 
negative realist view has to be accepted, or whether there still remains at least some scope 
for international law to regulate the use of force in ways that are principled, rather than 
opportunistic, and which enhance doctrines of international legality and the rule of law even 
in contexts where this does serve the material interests of the nation states involved in the 
endorsement action. 
                                                          
5 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 1118. 
6 Anthony C Arend and Robert J Beck, International Law & the Use of Force (Routledge 1993). 
7 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen  J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law-An Interactional Account (Cambridge Studies in 




Theoretical Frameworks Relating to International Law 
and Relations 
The authors writing in this area approach the topic of international law from differing 
interpretive perspectives. It is the nature of their underlying approach that dictates, or at 
least significantly shapes, their starting point and hence ultimate views in the international 
arena. I will show below that realists, for example, place a greater emphasis on the 
transnational political contexts of international law; these authors examine the implications 
of using force against an aggressor state and as such the consequences of these actions. By 
contrast, legalists are only interested in what the law currently is (whether X use of force 
falls inside or outside prevailing legal tests contained in legal doctrine). 
This chapter will conclude with applying the different schools to the examples of Iraq, Libya 
and Afghanistan, explaining how the viewpoint of an author, such as legalist, realist, et al 
can change their perspective on whether they view any particular use of force as legitimate 
or justified.  
Before discussing substantive issues, it is useful at the outset to define key terms in order to 
clarify the scope of this project. International law comprises a system of rules, and principles 
governing the international relations between sovereign states and other institutional 
subjects of international law,8 for example the United Nations, and regional blocs, such as 
the EU and the African Union. The relevant international law measures concerning the use 
of force are UN authorisations contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and self-defence, 
which is preserved under Article 51 of the Charter.     
Legalism/Positivism  
Legalism is perhaps the most straightforward view for those who have been schooled in a 
traditional and conventional legal education shaped by legal positivism. For legalist scholars 
there is a viable law / politics dichotomy. Law is absolute. There is no justification for 
                                                          
8 Mark Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 3. 
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breaching law. The law is stated as such and thus legalism has similarities with legal 
positivism albeit more constrained. Legalism is concerned only with what the law is; there is 
no scope for acting within the ‘spirit’ of any legislation. It is a technical exercise concerned 
solely with the letter of the law.  In this view, authors suggest that only positive law laid 
down by constitutionally authorised legislators / legislative mechanisms is valid law and the 
proper object of strictly legal analysis.9 Positivists in a similar vein would argue that this is 
the most rational way of ordering society.10 Positivism in a slightly broader sense aims to 
ensure that the law follows a determinate and more or less certain framework laid down in 
advance, so that its operation is predictable. Thus the key difference is that legalism has no 
concern for the application of the law. For both, the key distinction is between “what is” the 
law, as opposed to “what ought to be the law.” Hence, for legalists and positivists, legality 
comes from the source of law, not how effective or meritorious the action is. For a law on 
the use of force to be valid it must have a clear constitutional authority as recognised by the 
existing legal system. In common with realists, legal positivists such as Hans Kelsen would 
reject theories of international law which employ terms like “rights of mankind” or “justice,” 
unless and until these are embedded in concrete legal doctrines.11 Under the influence of 
legal positivism, legalists restrict their attention to legal rules enacted by the state, and 
exclude all law that cannot be traced back to the statute books or to the decisions of the 
courts.12 For those studying the use of force against states, there is no analytically relevant 
belief in a higher, ‘natural law’; the law is simply applied to the facts “as they are,” it could 
be described as a ‘technical’ exercise.  Positivists and legalists do not question the extent to 
which the law is effective as this is not a doctrinal question.13 Therefore legalists and 
positivists would not address any justifications for the use of force beyond what is clearly 
stated as permissible, and hence legal, through the enabling Resolution. These theorists 
would not address the morality of using armed force to prevent humanitarian suffering or 
the political implications, such as the veto, that may prevent the UNSC from releasing an 
enabling Resolution. 
                                                          
9 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd  edn, 1994); Kelsen H, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight tr, Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1967). 
10 ibid. 
11 W B Stern, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of International Law’ [1936] 30 The American Political Science Review 736-741. 




For positivists, Resolutions are to be read narrowly in a strict manner. It is presumed that 
there is a clear, literal, interpretation of the law that alone is binding. Positivism would not 
consider whether the use of force proposed was within the ‘spirit’ of the resolution - in the 
sense of purpose or policy or moral implications. Corten recognises the limitations of this 
strict interpretation of the law. He argues: ‘certain problems cannot be resolved by reliance 
on positivist styles of legal appraisal.’14 This statement is easily reconciled with the extra-
legal use of force as State practice is not always in line with a strictly positive approach. The 
action in Iraq from 1998 (which will be discussed later) clearly encompassed a more realist 
interpretation through its reliance on a ‘continuing’ authority to use force as opposed to a 
clear legal right to do so. 
Zolo states ‘within the international community there is currently a trend to legitimize 
‘humanitarian interference’, even in its military form.’15 This is reiterated by authors 
including, in a vaguely positive vein, Chesterman et al16 who discuss how the UK sought 
authorisation to use force in Iraq (2003). However, in the absence of such authorisation, the 
UK government was still prepared to take action. Chesterman et al propose that it is a 
psychological barrier which ensures that states seek authorisation.17 This supposes that 
States want to be seen as following international law and as such will seek to find a 
justification even if it expounds the boundaries of current international agreements. 
Brunnee and Toope make a broad claim stating the ‘strong majority of states and 
commentators reaffirm the view that the correct legal framework to deal with terrorist 
violence is international and national criminal law, not the inter-state use of force.’ 18 This 
perspective is certainly legalistic and – from a realist perspective at least - perhaps naïve.  
Roberts suggests two doctrines about a possibly expanded right of states to use force: the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and the doctrine reserving a right to act pre-
                                                          
14 Oliver Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate’ [2006] 16 European 
Journal of International Law 803-822. 
15 Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity – war, law and global order (Continuum 2002) 68.  
16 Simon Chesterman, Thomas M Franck and David M Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations-Documents and Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2008) 71. 
17 ibid, see also Mark Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 11 ‘states suffer from a ‘psychological 
barrier against breaking international law.’ 
18 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen  J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law-An Interactional Account (Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law 2010) 279. 
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emptively against emerging threats.19However, he recognises that this is extra-legal and as 
such does not agree with such uses of force. Also influenced by legalism, Shaw cannot 
reconcile an emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention with article 2(4) of the Charter. 
He states: ‘unless one either adopts a rather artificial definition of the ‘territorial integrity’ 
criterion in order to permit temporary violations or posits the establishment of the right in 
customary law’20 then the doctrine is dubious. Roberts legalistic approach to state 
intervention criticises the extra-legal use of force as: ‘challenging the twin normative 
principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states as enshrined in the UN 
Charter.’21 Without clear authorisation to use force he assumes that any action is not legally 
valid. His emphasis is on the strict legality of any use of force, rather than its explanation. 
Similarly, Shaw reiterates that pre-emptive action would be beyond what is currently 
acceptable in international law.22 There is clearly no legal basis from which this could 
develop. Nevertheless, he makes some suggestion as to what could possibly be acceptable 
from a legalist perspective:  ‘distinguishing anticipatory self-defence, where an armed attack 
is foreseeable, from interceptive self-defence, where an armed attack is imminent and 
unavoidable so that the evidential problems and temptations of the former concept are 
avoided without dooming threatened states to making the choice between violating 
international law and suffering the actual assault.’23 This theory also helps to lend legitimacy 
to some uses of force, and reiterates that Shaw’s overall approach aims to be in some sense 
objective. Whilst he would like to follow the legalistic approach he remains receptive to the 
legally unjustified use of force in certain unspecified circumstances. Overall he appears to 
modify strict legalism as he appreciates that law may need adaptation in order to be 
effective. 
Linked to positivism and legalism is a stance of proceduarlism. Proceduralism, as the name 
suggests, sees that procedures or rules are carried out as described. The proceduralist 
approach assumes the law should work effectively without the need for adaptation. This line 
of thought is similar to legalists, in that the law should be applied as it is. However, what is 
                                                          
19 A Roberts ‘The Use of Force’ in David M Malone (eds) The UN Security Council- From the Cold War to the 21st Century,( Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc.2004) 133. 
20 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 1156. 
21 A Roberts ‘The Use of Force’ in David M Malone (eds) The UN Security Council- From the Cold War to the 21st Century,( Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc.2004) 133. 
22 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 1140. 
23 ibid 1139. 
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different, is that proceduralists assume that the law is effective when it is applied in a 
technically correct manner. They do not consider that there may be flaws, or power politics 
that inhibit the application or use of the rules or procedures. Proceduarlism is tied to a 
procedural form of rationality where the procedures themselves are followed for their own 
sake, and justice is defined purely in these terms of a right to have the correct procedure 
followed, such as due process. ‘Procedural accounts of international legitimacy are 
predicated on the assumption that the test of legitimacy is state practice.’24 Dixon finds that 
‘the Security Council’s action [under Article 42] in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 is the most effective action undertaken so far and the most widely supported. 
However, ‘the UN has not lived up to expectations after Iraq [1990].’25 Dixon’s view is 
sceptical. He finds the initial action a success due to the legal nature of Resolution 678, and 
the use of force achieving its main objective, the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. However, 
his view argues that the use of force after the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait is not 
inherently legal. He suggests that it is based on power politics: ‘there is one law for the 
weak, and another law for the strong.’26 He is proceduralist in his approach assuming that 
the UNSC should have the ability to work effectively. It should be able to yield results 
without ‘coalitions of the willing’. Dixon is a partial realist in that he recognises the 
determination of international law by international relations and politics. He also 
appreciates the merits of the US led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; however he is not at 
ease with entirely unauthorised state action: that is, legally unregulated power politics. 
Realism 
Hans Morgenthau refers to realism as a form of functionalism involving the: ‘search for the 
psychological, social, political and economic forces which determine the actual content and 
working of legal rules and which, in turn, are determined by them.’27 Realism criticises the 
positivist view as being too narrow and strict.  
‘The fundamental concept underpinning the realist school of thought is that states 
are mutually self-interested actors that, in situations where they must choose a 
particular course of action out of multiple alternatives, will engage in a cost-benefit 
                                                          
24 Nicholas  J Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford University Press 2000) 21. 
25 Mark Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 331. 
26 Ibid 332. 
27 Hans  J Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism and International Law,’ [1940] 34 The American Journal of International Law 260-284. 
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analysis of each option. To realist scholars, states will inevitably make the only 
‘rational’ choice.’28  
The realist argument suggests that there is governance through law, but a wider 
meaning can be discovered; international law is not a standalone subject, it is a dependent 
subset of international relations and international politics. Realists interpret such law to 
achieve pragmatic effects, but should reject ‘just-war’ theory.29 For realists, if an act can be 
defended through either reason or in terms of pragmatic state interests, then it has some 
validity.  In terms of UNSC Resolutions, realists would argue that if the wider aims and 
objectives of the Resolution were met, then the use of force could be permitted. Zolo adds 
to this by arguing effectiveness should not be solely on the immediate outcome; ‘it should 
also gauge the impact it has had and may have in the near future on the regional and 
international political balance of power.’30 Realism could also be described as a form of 
pragmatism, interpreting the law in terms of a device to achieve practical and extrinsic 
results, rather than the fulfilment of abstract principles such as a universalistic 
interpretation of the rule of law. Janzekovic for example states: ‘realists are people whose 
interest is focused on things they consider to be actual or real as distinguished from 
abstractions.’31 
Morgenthau, is a key representative of the realist school of thought, or to be more 
precise a political realist. Political realists ‘think in terms of interest defined as power.’32 
That is, they seek to discover how a policy underlying a legal doctrine could affect the power 
of the nation.33 There is thus a close consideration of power politics, and the instrumental 
use of international law as a weapon within the conduct of transnational politics. ‘One 
cannot understand what is at stake in an armed conflict involving the leading world powers 
(and hence, the reasons and objectives of the conflict) without analysing the long-term 
dynamics of ‘global power’.’34 Overall, political realists consider what the consequences of 
each alternative action are, and, how does each alternative impact upon the States quota of 
‘political’ power.  Building on from this perspective, political realists contest  overly grand 
                                                          
28 Gideon Boas, Public International Law – Contemporary Principles and Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 18. 
29 Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity – war, law and global order (Continuum 2002) 88. 
30 ibid 134. 
31 John Janzekovic, The Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention – Morality and Practicalities (Ashgate 2006) 43. 
32 Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1978) 4-15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity – war, law and global order (Continuum 2002) 54. 
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and lofty concepts such as ‘internationalism or humanitarianism / humanitarian 
intervention’ as they suggest these apparently ‘morally positive’ terms are covertly 
politicised and deployed selectively as weapons in pursuit of power politics. For example, 
why should a country choose to provide humanitarian assistance to one country and not 
another? If these terms are to be valid then they need to be applied universally.  For 
example, states were quick to intervene in Kosovo in 1999, but there has been little action 
presently in Syria (pre-ISIL attacks) and Israel which could be considered as equal 
humanitarian catastrophes to Kosovo. 
Morgenthau finds that the problem with legalistic and positivistic approaches to 
international law and the social sciences more generally is a form of dogmatism. He refers 
to the ‘tendency to stick to their assumptions and to suffer constant defeat from experience 
rather than to change their assumptions in the light of contradicting facts.’35 He is referring 
here to the difficulties with a legalist or positivist view in applying international law that 
reduces it to legal doctrine alone, which then takes on an absolute status however 
unrealistic it is in particular contexts of application. Morgenthau suggests that positivism 
does not work in a changing society: ‘it was the general attitude of the internationalists to 
take the appropriateness of the devices for granted and to blame the facts for the failure.’36 
He assumes positivism is outdated as adopting an empirical approach to international law 
and relations; realism however has proved itself to be more pertinent. Carl Schmitt could 
also be described as a political realist. He has been reported by Dyzenhaus as suggesting 
that legitimacy, or in other words, justifiability, will always assert itself over legality. ‘His 
(Schmitt) is a highly political conception of law in which law and morality are the products of 
a battle for political supremacy between hostile groups.’37 In his book ‘The Concept of the 
Political’, Schmitt discusses the idea of a world state that embraces the entire globe and 
humanity, as not being a political entity and could only loosely be called a state. He suggests 
that a global organisation ‘means nothing else than the utopian idea of total de-
politicization.’ 38 This would seem to assume that if the UN or states were to appeal to 
humanity, as in appeals to “humanitarian intervention” they would somehow lose 
                                                          
35 Hans  J Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism and International Law,’ [1940] 34 The American Journal of International Law 260-284. 
36 ibid. 
37 David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy – Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller on Weimar (Oxford University Press 2003) 2. 
38 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 55-57. 
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credibility. He suggests those who invoke humanity are trying to cheat.39 Schmitt is arguing 
that the word ‘humanity’ is used for a different meaning; that is, in order to intervene for 
other, less favourable motives. Zolo appeals to this perspective in saying: ‘to qualify a war as 
‘humanitarian intervention’ is a typical ploy for self-legitimization by those who wage that 
war.’40 However Zolo is keen to suggest that one does not have to accept this. He argues the 
word ‘humanity’ could be used to degrade the foe.41  
Morgenthau’s realism has since influenced other writers. Michael Byers42 in his article on 
terrorism also writes from a political realist perspective. He discusses state action as an 
interaction between international politics and international law. He considers that the US 
purposefully chose to use self-defence as the rhetorical / ideological basis for their action in 
Afghanistan for political and legal gain. He assumes that the US chose this claimed basis to 
refrain from restrictions that might otherwise be imposed by a UNSC Resolution. Byers is 
particularly critical of the US position, suggesting that: ‘the US may now be employing 
similar legal strategies in an effort to develop or extend a right of anticipatory self-defence 
against terrorist acts.’43 His writings suggest the US acts only for its own collective gain and 
appeals to legality only selectivity whenever this suits its ulterior purposes. However, it 
could be argued that the US has at least some support for its actions. The UNSC has not 
condemned in any official capacity, the US led war in Afghanistan; and US troops in 
Afghanistan have been supported by troops from the UK. Furthermore, international law is 
a product of states themselves, thus if custom leads to the development of anticipatory 
action for self-defence it can be assumed that this is because it is accepted as so. 
Robert Gilpin has applied political realist theory to contemporary American policies in the 
Middle East44 and is critical of the politics surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.45 His article 
supports the view that the war in Iraq does not have a sound basis in international law. He 
does not support a realist view and maintains that the law should be read from a positivist 
perspective. 
                                                          
39 ibid 54. 
40Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity – war, law and global order (Continuum 2002 ) 38. 
41 Ibid 39. 
42 Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the use of Force and International Law after 11 September,’ (2002) 16 International Relations 155. 
43 ibid 162. 
44 Robert Gilpin, ‘War is too important to be left to ideological amateurs’ [2005] 19 International Relations 5. 
45 ibid.  
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John Mearsheimer is the leading proponent of offensive realism. Offensive realism 
maintains that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony 
for their security interests because the anarchic makeup of the international system creates 
strong incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of 
competitors.46  
Ago47 suggests that too strict a reliance on words (of international law doctrine) is what can 
lead to errors. He suggests that positive law is a barrier to the useful application of 
international law and that ‘language’ should not be strictly applied as an end in itself; words 
should be interchangeable. This is similar to the UK and USA’s argument on the continuing 
authority of UN Resolutions. 
Realism and the use of force 
In considering the efficacy of UN Resolutions there is a supportive realist view, in that the 
law should be concerned with practical consequences. White is of the opinion that Article 
41 sanctions are usually inadequate without the threat or use of military force.48 Typically, 
non-military sanctions have been criticised for their harsh humanitarian consequences and 
ineffectiveness in achieving results, as a consequence of this frustration states engage in 
military action. For example, Iraq in the early 2000’s had failed to comply with previous 
resolutions,49 and the coalition feared that this non-compliance would continue. The lack of 
any significant and/or desired result of the non-military sanctions imposed against Iraq was 
thus cited as one of the reasons for the need to use force in the country based on 
Resolution 1441; albeit that Resolution 1441 was not a clear authorisation to use force. 
Nevertheless ‘economic sanctions [may] have their limitations, but the use of military force 
is no panacea either.’50 Thus there is argument to support the claim that non-military 
sanctions are for the most part inadequate, hence states use of armed force in order to 
attain results. Nevertheless, the use of military action is also seen as having its faults, and an 
aim of this thesis is to discover whether the use of military force can be effective in attaining 
results. 
                                                          
46 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 2001). 
47 Roberto Ago, ‘Positive Law and International Law’ (1957) 51 The American Journal of International Law, 691-733. 
48 Nigel D White, The United Nations System-Toward International Justice (Lynne Reinner 2002) 160. 
49 Resolution 1441 (2002). 
50 David Cortright and George ALopez, The Sanctions Decade- Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Lynne Reinner Publishers 2000) 15. 
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In a broad claim, Shaw states: ‘There is no unified system of sanctions in international law in 
the sense that there is in municipal law, but there are circumstances in which the use of 
force is regarded as justified and legal.’51 He describes these circumstances as being self-
help actions or Security Council sanctions.52 Shaw is dubious as to the existence of 
‘international law’ per se due to its lack of a regulatory framework. He assumes the 
international legal order exists because states feel the necessity to be bound by their own 
agreements; his argument is based on the consensus (the majority creating new norms and 
the acceptance by other states of such new rules) and the consent of states in creating 
binding obligations.53 Shaw is of the opinion that law and politics can never completely 
separate, and hence UNSC regulation will only be forthcoming when it does not have a 
detrimental effect to any of the permanent five members. Overall, Shaw takes an unbiased 
approach to the use of force. He empathises with the coalition of the willing justifications 
but also reiterates the omission of any explicit mandate from the UN. However, more 
specifically, his presumption that UNSC regulation will depend upon the interests of the 
permanent five members is a political realist approach. For Shaw, the use of force in any 
given circumstance is dependent upon the political power of those states involved. 
Roberts54 broadly political realist view is that it is the different power-political interests of 
states, and their different visions of how the world should be ordered, that affect how they 
interpret the “legality” of certain types of intervention.   
Dixon discusses a variety of situations in which states have made claims that the use of force 
is lawful if intended to achieve certain ‘approved purposes.’55 These purposes are: reprisals; 
protection of nationals at home and abroad; terrorism and the use of force; humanitarian 
intervention; self-determination and national liberation movements; and hot pursuit. 
Whether this claim of lawfulness is correct is open to debate. It is dependent on an 
expanded version of self-defence, or because the use of force does not precisely violate Art. 
2(4) if interpreted literally. States have also claimed that new customary rules have 
developed since 1945.56  None of these explanations may grant the use of force a legal 
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basis; however they could lend a hand to describing it as legitimate. Therefore, Dixon takes 
a more pragmatic view of states use of force. He is more concerned with the legitimacy 
aspect of action; if a use of force can be justified for ‘good’ reasons then it can in certain 
circumstances be considered acceptable. Dixon assumes that states will always justify a use 
of force that they perceive to be legitimate even if it is for ‘other purposes’ and beyond the 
scope of a legalist approach. In essence, states will act as realism suggests, in that those 
states who agree with a particular use of force will inevitably ‘find’ a justification for its use. 
This suggests that democratic or constitutional states value legitimacy over legality, 
presuming of course, that those justifications are genuinely held beliefs. 
 In sum, realists are more pragmatic that legalists or positivists. Fundamentally, they 
are receptive to a broader interpretation of the law. They can appreciate the practical 
difficulties of applying a strict legalist approach and would generally support the ‘extra-legal’ 
use of force to achieve a pragmatic benefit. 
Constructivism 
A potentially viable alternative to realism is constructivism. ‘Whereas realism assumes that 
the interests of states are fixed and exogenous, constructivism views the interests and 
identities of states as endogenous and constituted through interaction with other states on 
the basis of shared norms.’57 For constructivists, changes in history and society affect how a 
state perceives international law. The importance in constructivist theory is the meaning of 
the object. ‘For example, a nuclear weapon in the United Kingdom and a nuclear weapon in 
North Korea may be materially identical but they possess radically different meanings for 
the United States.’58  
‘The belief that reality is socially constructed through selective interpretation relative 
to the concerns and interests of interpreters, leads constructivists to place a greater 
role on norm development, identity, and ideational power than the other major 
theoretical paradigms within international law.’59 
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This approach may, depending on the circumstances, consider the use of force against 
hostile states to have value. The key to this approach is the use of the phrase ‘hostile’ state. 
If a state is engaging in aggression or showing antagonism then their holding of weapons is 
likely to pose more of a threat than a state at peace. The use of force in Iraq can be taken as 
an example here. Iraq, throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s has acted in a belligerent way. It 
repeatedly failed to adhere to UNSC Resolutions, in particular Resolution 1441 which 
required Iraq to ‘disarm’. Therefore, albeit the use of force in Iraq in 2003 could be termed 
‘illegal’ in that the UNSC ‘decided to remain seized of the matter’60 this particular use of 
force could be seen as legitimate from a constructivist approach. If WMD were perceived as 
a real threat, then based on Iraq’s history, constructivists would view this threat as 
outweighing the perceived value of adherence to the dictates of legalism. 
Liberal cosmopolitanism 
An alternative approach to realism is cosmopolitanism - an extension of classic liberalism. 
Liberal theory, for Boas, focusses on ‘the relationship between the state and society.’61 
Liberals look to the domestic politics of states to suggest how this will affect that states 
international policies. Therefore those more democratic states are more likely to be 
accepting of international policy as they see it as an extension of domestic policies than 
those states who could be termed less democratic and as such have different ideals of 
society. 
‘The cosmopolitan obtains to the cosmopolis: a harmonious and inclusive, universal order.’62 
The cosmopolitan lawyer ‘invokes aspirations to a system of law capable of purposefully 
sustaining order in the world on unified terms.’63 ‘Cosmopolitanism replaces the political 
authority of sovereign states (and their legacy) with the authority of universal norms.’64 It 
could be argued that cosmopolitanism is idealistic, albeit well-intentioned.65 
‘Liberal cosmopolitanism appears as a tendency within Kantian and neo-Kantian schools of 
legal and political theory to advance arguments founded upon the presumed validity of 
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abstractly universal categories, including ‘global justice’ , as key to the analysis of 
international law and international relations.’66 Liberal cosmopolitanism offers these 
‘abstractly universal categories’ the same or higher status than existing law. ‘Hence, the 
concrete rights of citizens provided for by historically specific and politically contestable 
constitutional arrangements and statutory measures of particular nation states, are 
relegated to a lower position on the assumed ‘totem pole’ of rights, and indeed earmarked 
for redundancy and substitution by cosmopolitan alternatives.’67  
This approach generates a negative reaction from the rival realist school. For example, 
Schmitt suggests liberal cosmopolitanism appeals to universal values like “humanity/ 
humanitarian” as an imperialistic smokescreen for the pursuit of specific and down-to-earth 
interests in keeping with realistic tradition.68 An example of the step forward from classical 
international law to cosmopolitan law is the war in Kosovo.69 This, suggests Zolo, will lead 
‘to truly effective international institutions, such as an international Court of Justice 
endowed with binding jurisdiction, and a General Assembly of the United Nations composed 
not only of representatives of governments but also of direct representatives of the citizens 
of each state.’70 
It could be suggested that Beardsworths’71 distinction between: cultural; moral; normative; 
institutional; legal and political cosmopolitanism are all in fact elements of liberal 
cosmopolitanism. He refers to the ‘fundamental’ rights of societies in moral 
cosmopolitanism, and he himself links moral to normative. Institutional cosmopolitanism is 
concerned with ‘practical’ solutions, which Beardsworth links to ‘global justice.’ Again in 
defining legal cosmopolitanism he links it to moral cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism 
‘aims to provide basic moral rights with international/global legal status and international 
law with moral foundation.’72 Finally political cosmopolitanism is again related to global 
justice but supplemented with ‘political advocacy, political judgement and political 
leadership’73 In terms of Beardsworths’ distinction it is the closest ‘sub-section’ to realism. 
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Beardsworth’s development of these sub categories of liberal cosmopolitanism is too 
intricate for this thesis and hence liberal cosmopolitanism will be referred to as a whole. 
Two other forms of cosmopolitanism can be distinguished; innate and constitutional. ‘Innate 
cosmopolitanism stands for the proposition that the world as a whole represents a 
phenomenon with interests and even a will of its own, and is capable of establishing a 
foundation for universal norms under international law.’74 This is linked to the 
establishment of rules based on continued state practice. Constitutional cosmopolitanism 
examines ‘possibility or reality of a world constitution.’75 
Linked to (cosmopolitan) liberalism is the concept of Natural Law theory. 
Beardsworth would argue the link is very tight: ‘all cosmopolitan thought is moral.’76 Natural 
law uses reason to decide legal rights. It is a view that certain rights or values are inherent in 
or universally recognizable by society. Natural law theory has resonance with realists in that 
the law is not a strict exercise in applying facts to legal rules. However, natural law goes 
beyond realism. It considers that there are universal standards of right and wrong based on 
nature or reason. Naturalists would believe positive law should bend.77 Zolo addressing this 
perspective argues: ‘in cases where positive law is inadequate and international institutions 
prove powerless, a superior normative level, ethics, comes into play, imposing the duty to 
intervene by force of arms outside or even against the explicit provisions of law.’78 This is in 
stark contrast to legalists who believe there is nothing higher than self-interpretations of 
state authority. Natural law theorists believe that there is a higher or divine authority, above 
the positive law. As an example, human rights would be considered not only to be a legal 
duty embedded in specific positive doctrines, but to be, say, a universal duty to protect 
civilians. ‘Human rights must be considered ius cogens; that is, rights that are valid and 
enforceable in every corner of the globe.’79  From this perspective, state sovereignty here is 
not absolute – as tends to be the case in realist approaches; higher rights can be forcefully 
protected. Zolo summarising the cosmopolitan perspective states: ‘Kosovo was a success for 
international ethics and justice… Europe and the United States had a moral, even more than 
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a legal, right to prevent a revival of the horrible crimes of World War II.’80 Walzer is a natural 
law theorist. Action can be justified if it ‘shocks the moral conscience of mankind.’81 The key 
to this theory is ‘justification.’ If action is not taken in pure aggression, and there are 
genuine reasons for intervention then this is for the greater good. This is qualified by Walzer 
in presuming that there is no alternative.82 Janzekovic is also a supporter as he discusses 
action which could be morally just; response to aggression, a pre-emptive strike against 
imminent or likely aggression, and a response to the threats against the lives and well-being 
of citizens of other states.83 Therefore the use of force against Iraq in response to their 
aggression towards Kuwait, under this description, could be justified by natural law. It could 
also be used to describe the action against Libya as protecting citizens, and could certainly 
be a possible justification for intervention in the present situations in Syria and Israel. 
It is apparent from the different philosophies of law, that there is a tension between 
interpretations of the implications of strict legality on the one hand, and broader notions of 
moral / political legitimacy on the other.  Positivist theory is in complete opposition to any 
thoughts on legitimate action that extend beyond a legalistic and literal interpretation of 
existing substantive doctrine and procedural rules. A clear authorisation to use force is in 
keeping with the concepts of positivism. For positivists, as long as there exists a sovereign 
jurisdiction, what that jurisdiction decides is law. However, when thinking in terms of 
international law and the United Nations, the UNSC consists of only five permanent 
members, and each one of those holds the power of veto. Therefore, the concept of 
democracy within the UNSC is dubious.  Those writers who appeal to strict legality do not 
consider the question of five countries controlling law enacted in the name of the whole 
world or “humanity”. However, when states suggest during their reasoning for engaging in 
the use of force that they are acting “within the spirit” of the resolution, this is much closer 
to natural law theory and perhaps realism. Natural law theorists are not at ease with the 
undemocratic nature of the UNSC, and suggest that in addition to states, non-state actors 
should also be involved in law making. Zolo suggests that: ‘law alone will [not] bring about 
international peace and justice.’84 Furthermore, for realists, the effectiveness of action has a 
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substantial impact. In brief, pacifists would object to the use of military force on the 
assumption that physical force creates more problems than it tries to solve, and that it is 
morally wrong anyway to use directed force.85 However, Zolo writes that for cosmopolitans, 
the Kosovo war could be viewed as a pacifying mission which made use of arms, but did so 
with the consensus of the international community.86  
In considering these outlooks, what is apparent is that world peace, order and 
stability should be the dominant factor regardless of the legal approach.87 This author 
argues that an ideal position is one located somewhere between realism and natural law, 
cosmopolitanism being the optimal doctrine. The advantages of natural law are that the 
‘spirit’ of the resolution and humanitarian intervention can be used to lend legitimacy to 
action that is urgently required. Following a strict legal approach can often be impractical, 
and could lead to legally authorised inaction in dangerous situations of on-going genocide, 
for example. However, in parts, natural law can go too far in devaluing state sovereignty and 
suggesting non-state actors become a part of the law-making process.  
To better meet expectations of international law the UNSC could benefit from reform to 
become a more workable place for creating binding international regulations. This author 
would suggest in particular reform of the UNSC and voting procedures in order to increase 
democracy within the international arena. Realism is a key attitude, and the ideology of 
pragmatism and utilitarian effectiveness, divorced from idealistic utopianism are in keeping 
with the author’s own thoughts. Subsequently, the doctrines of humanitarian intervention 
and responsibility to protect could be integrated within international law, and hence states 
would have an obligation to act in all situations coming within the definitions, this would 
hopefully result in more consistency when invoking humanitarian doctrines. 
 
INTERPRETING THE USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES 
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The legality and legitimacy issues surrounding the use of force against Iraq (but also in 
general) form an important debate as ‘the fabric of orderly relations between nations, the 
health of the human rights norm and the struggle for a better world are built on respect for 
international law.’88 Therefore, as in all legal systems, there must be adherence to 
international law. If there is not, then those relations will break down. 
In March 2003, when the United States and the UK took further military action 
against Iraq, the two governments relied on one main legal rationale: Iraq’s failure to 
implement certain UN Security Council resolutions and the coalition’s continuing authority 
to use force based in particular on Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441.89 In this aspect, Roberts 
finds legality in the use of force, he is of the opinion that the resurrection of previous 
resolutions is acceptable if the use of force is aimed at achieving the goals set out in those 
resolutions. Roberts is certainly practical in his outlook, he does not follow the strict legality 
route but rather finds legality in the wider context of the resolutions. He assumes in the Iraqi 
context that the use of force was necessary in order to rectify Iraq’s non-compliance with 
cease-fire agreements. In contrast, Brunnee and Toope suggest that the Council had decided 
that the use of force was not required. ‘The Council had already determined that there had 
been a breach of peace and security by Iraq, (Resolution 1441) and the council was 
therefore within its power to take action.’ 90 As the UNSC had not taken any further action, 
except requesting states to give support to UNMOVIC and deciding to remain ‘seized of the 
matter’91 there is credibility to Brunnee and Toope’s argument. These authors have a 
legalistic approach. They suggest ‘the Council’s refusal to adopt an authorising resolution 
actually showed the Council members’ adherence to the criteria of legality, even in the face 
of extreme pressure from some of its most powerful members.’92 Accordingly, if the UNSC 
wanted states to use force, they would have authorised it. White is also legalistic in his 
approach to the use of force. Without a clear UN authorisation to use force he is of the 
opinion that the use of force cannot be justified. He is particularly strict in his view of states’ 
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use of force, and would not find legitimacy without indisputable legality. 93   Lobel & Ratner 
argue that for states to take military action there must be a clear and unambiguous 
mandate in the form of an authorisation to use force.94 The resurrection of previous 
resolutions did not achieve this. These authors follow a strict legalist interpretation of 
international law. They consider a legalistic approach of the law to be absolute. They 
assume the UNSC will authorise the use of force if required. However, a contrary argument 
would suggest that with the threat of the veto, UNSC authorisation may not be as easy a 
task as they assume. Resolution 1441 was intended as a final opportunity and it was 
provided that serious consequences would follow Iraq’s failure to comply. The UNSC did 
confirm that Iraq’s failure to comply with Resolution 687 was a threat to international peace 
and security. Nevertheless, whether this amounts to a justification in international law for 
the UK and US to use force in the face of the opposition of other Security Council members 
remains controversial.95 Members of George W. Bush’s administration variously suggested 
that military action was necessary and justified. This was because of the urgent need for an 
end to the repression of the Iraqi people, for regime change, for preventive war to stop a 
possible future threat, and for anticipatory self-defence against an imminent threat.96 
Despite that, legalists would argue that none of the reasons listed are in fact strictly legal. 
When action was taken in 2003 there was no clear UN mandate, but could the aims listed 
above give the use of force a legitimate basis? If UNSC action was unforthcoming, do the 
ends justify the means? The US claimed the military intervention had the purpose of 
ensuring implementation of previous UN Security Council resolutions. As depicted here, 
there can be controversy when any interpretation other than legalism is used. This thesis 
seeks to address whether any justification other than pure legalism can be acceptable; in 
particular the realist attitude towards the use of force and the morality of humanitarian 
intervention. 
Importantly, it is not for the member states to determine the objective that the Council 
seeks to achieve in conferring the mandate. As Berman finds, this must remain squarely 
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within the exclusive competence of the UNSC.97 Therefore, even if one is not a strict legalist, 
it is only the interpretation of the mandate, not the mandate itself that should be 
questioned. Berman assumes that the problems concerning force stem from the 
‘authorisation model.’ That is, the Council authorising states to use force through 
resolutions, rather than the model envisaged in Article 43. This ‘authorisation’ model allows 
states to interpret the Resolution to their own gain. It is paramount, that the main aims and 
objectives of the UNSC are met, even if other non-UNSC issues are on states agenda. What 
could be problematic then is where the ‘other’ goal takes over. It is arguable that this has 
been the case with the prolonged use of force in Iraq. 
Brunnee and Toope consider the war in Iraq to have led to one of the biggest mass protests 
in history. They suggest that the underlying reason for this was a sense that the planned 
invasion broke the rules of international law.98 From this perspective they would criticise 
political realism. They state: ‘the constant abuse of [international] law is served up to 
suggest that international law is fundamentally flawed, that it can never be more than a 
mask for power relationships.’99 Here they assume that states only engage in the use of 
force for their own political gain. Thakur elaborates by saying: ‘No one disputed the 
abhorrent nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, but many questioned the circumstances 
governing the use of force.’100 Nevertheless, if Saddam Hussein’s regime can be described as 
‘abhorrent’ then there is an argument to suggest that the repression of this kind of regime, 
if needs be through the use of force, should at least be legitimate. This highlights the 
difference between legalism on the one hand, and liberal cosmopolitanism, natural law 
approaches on the other. 
 
THE USE OF FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN & LIBYA AS A SECOND ILLUSTRATION OF DIVERGENT 
PERSPECTIVES 
                                                          
97 F Berman, ‘The authorization model: Resolution 678 and its effects,’ in David M Malone (eds) The UN Security Council- From the Cold 
War to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004) 158. 
98 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen  J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law-An Interactional Account (Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law 2010) 1. 
99 ibid 3. 
100 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge University Press 2006) 3. 
23 
 
There is less academic international law literature on the use of force in Afghanistan and 
Libya, primarily as these are more recent examples of states use of force. 
Resolution 1368 (Afghanistan) was not a direct authorisation to use force, albeit this is not 
specifically required for the initiation of a self-defence action. However, by recognising the 
right of self-defence in this context, the UN helped to clarify that there was an international 
legal basis for the subsequent US-led intervention in Afghanistan.101 The initial action was 
clearly in response to aggression, the UNSC Resolution was welcomed but not essential, 
nevertheless this Resolution adds nothing to the prolonged action against Afghanistan. The 
initial response to aggression was against a terrorist group, not a state. However, it would 
seem that this is within the boundaries of international self-defence law. ‘There is no reason 
to limit a state’s right to protect itself to an attack by another state. The right of self-defence 
is a right to use force to avert an attack. The source of the attack, whether a state or a non-
state actor, is irrelevant to the existence of the right.’102 Therefore, this response is 
legalistic. What is problematic is: ‘the right to take action against the state that is the 
presumed source of such attacks, since it must be conceded that an attack against a non-
state actor within a state will inevitably constitute the use of force on the territorial 
state.’103 This action would fall foul of a legalistic interpretation; however realists and 
cosmopolitans alike would be able to justify the use of force as within the spirit of self-
defence. If the terrorists inhabit a state, then to use the doctrine of self-defence a 
defendant state must be permitted to enter another state which is harbouring terrorists.  
The armed force used against Libya in 2012 has some media coverage in national 
newspapers, but limited academic coverage. Hence this is an area that this thesis will 
research in more depth. 
Resolution 1973 (2011) did not permit ground troops in Libya, or the removal of Gaddafi 
through forceful means. What ensued were Special Forces on the ground and a claim that it 
was impossible to protect civilians without the toppling or possible assassination of Gaddafi. 
The bombing raids carried out by Britain on civilian targets in order to reach Gaddaffi where 
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not strictly permitted within Resolution 1973. Therefore, this use of force would be 
criticised from a legalist perspective. However, the issue to be discussed here is whether an 
‘illegal’ opposition force can in fact have some legitimacy. If, as it was suggested, it was 
impossible to protect Libyan citizens without removing Gaddaffi, then perhaps force used 
beyond the enabling resolution can be justified if its aim was to meet the overall objective 
of the resolution. Can a use of force beyond the enabling Resolution ever be justified? From 
a political realist perspective, the use of force would be termed as an inevitability of the 
power politics of the intervening states; from a liberal cosmopolitan, the use of force would 
be held in higher regard as preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted that those authors who are positivist or legalist in 
nature will not accept claims of ‘legitimacy’ for the use of force other than in terms of 
existing legal rules. If a use of force is illegal in the technical sense then it will remain illegal, 
regardless of the reasons for intervention or the outcomes. Those with a realist, 
cosmopolitan or natural law outlook will find it easier to reconcile uses of force with 
legitimacy based on factual circumstances. Blatant aggression will never be legitimate by 
any school of thought, but if the use of force met the wider terms of the Resolution as in 
Libya 2011, or prevented humanitarian suffering as in Kosovo in 1999 then these latter 
ideologies could find favour. The underlying perspectives of these different schools needed 
to be established as they help to explain the divergent positions taken in practice. 
 The limitations of each perspective are also detected in analysing the outcomes of 
any use of force. Legalists will never move beyond a strict interpretation of international 
law. As this chapter has identified, legalists would not view the prolonged force in Kosovo 
and Libya, for example, as legal. Realism and cosmopolitan theorists might see the use of 
extra-legal force as legitimate in certain circumstances if the justifications are valid. Realists 
accept power politics as motivation if it achieves a desired result; whereas liberal 
cosmopolitans would accept the use of force to achieve ‘global justice’. However, the 
problem here as opposed to legalist thought is that the use of force remains illegal.  
The next chapter will investigate the use of force against states in more detail. It will 
consider the legal framework within which international law operates. It will identify what 
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can be termed “strictly legal” through a legalist approach and the problems that can arise in 
light of such an interpretation. This will lead on to Chapter three which will discuss the 
extent to which states operate within the legal framework and hence Chapter four will 

















Towards Identifying the Framework of Legal Doctrine 
This chapter will explain the specifically legal position in relation to inter-state use of force. 
It will begin with the traditional theories of any use of force and then consider the legal 
framework of the UN Charter itself. Following this, my analysis will consider the status of 
self-defence and UN authorisations to use force. This discussion will answer the question: 
when can the use of force be used legally? Finally, this chapter will address questions and 
issues of interpretation arising in relation to the use of force and the criteria for recognising 
such deployments as legal. 
This chapter examines a legalistic approach to international law in considering the use of 
force against those classified as ‘aggressor’ states. That is those states which have engaged 
in the first act of aggression against another state. It will discuss what action is clearly a part 
of international law, and subsequently what problems can be identified in regards to 
interpreting international law. This chapter will discuss doctrinal legal research which can be 
defined in simple terms as research which asks what the law is in a particular area, 104 in 
terms of its technical meaning and scope and as part of the doctrine of “lawyers’ law.” The 
law is understood here as a self-referential system of technical rules. The main aim of this 
methodology is to describe and elucidate a body of legal doctrine comprised of a system of 
cases, rules, principles and basic axioms.105 A legalistic approach refers to what it takes to be 
the well-established rules and procedures in a given area of legal doctrine, presumed to 
exist in a self-contained realm of “lawyer’s law”, that provides the resources for 
international regulation. The rigidity of a legalistic approach will be identified, and the 
outcomes of the application of this approach to the inter-state use of force. 
In keeping with this methodology, there will be no attempt to place this aspect of 
international law doctrine in a wider political, moral or policy context, to analyse the factors 
behind its emergence or possible reform, or issues over its concrete application and 
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institutional enforcement, as these are reserved for the law in action approach, not legalistic 
doctrinal analysis. 
Legalism is one version of legal analysis; it is law in its strictest sense. Later there will be 
consideration of contextual approaches to interpreting the law on the use of armed force, 
this will address law in action and law as a social phenomenon. However, this chapter’s 
doctrinal analysis is important for developing subsequent arguments relating to the extra-
legal use of force in some circumstances. It will be used as a preliminary tool for creating the 
possibility of later considering the extent to which states follow the rules and principles of 
international law, which of course presupposes that one has already clarified the meaning 
and scope of such measures. The narrowly legalistic focus of this chapter thus sets the scene 
of the thesis, and enables debate to develop in subsequent chapters along wider, more 
contextual lines. The broad principles of international relations and the law will be discussed 
here, and later applied to case-studies. 
Viewed from a legalistic perspective, international law is primarily formulated by 
international agreements, which create rules binding upon the signatories, and customary 
rules, which are basically state practices recognised by the community at large as laying 
down patterns of conduct that have to be complied with.106 International law governs 
relations between nation states who – [in theory] voluntarily consent to be bound by 
treaties through which they gain international rights and responsibilities in respect to other 
nation-states.107 International law is horizontal (not vertical) in nature. States create the law, 
and choose to obey or disobey it. In theory, all states are “equal subjects”; with no one state 
possessing authority over the others. However, the UN has been vested with a form of 
sovereign power to maintain peace and security, and prevent the use of force. Neither the 
UN, nor any other international organisation, is a world legislature in a wider sense. Viewed 
in liberal terms presupposing a sharp law / politics dichotomy, the UNSC is a political and 
not a judicial body.108 Given our aims, a useful starting point is to consider international 
regulations governed by the UN Charter. 
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Historically, the decision to go to war was left to the discretion of states, one state could 
declare war against another state, with any justification, without the threat of legal 
interference; but following the secularisation of international law and the emphatic rise of 
national sovereignty, the term ‘just war’ no longer had a legal founding.  War was then 
permitted subject to the declarations made in The Hague 1889, which regulated specific 
aspects of warfare.  On this issue, there was no “higher authority” than the states 
themselves. In many but not all respects, the UN Charter involves a modification of the 
traditional framework. It is a body above the state, created by treaty, and agreed to by 
states. As the UN is founded in treaty law, there ought to be no violation of its founding 
rules.  
The UN was founded in 1945 after the conclusion of the Second World War in order to 
prevent the atrocities of war occurring again. This new international organisation would 
manage international conflict, something which its predecessor The League of Nations 
created on 10th January 1920 had failed to do, with respect to post WW1 conflicts, such as 
the Italian invasions of Ethiopia in October 1935. Initially, in 1945 fifty states met in San 
Francisco to draft the UN Charter. Its rules are generally regarded as rules of international 
law from the perspective of both treaty law and customary law.109 That is, customary 
international law is made up of rules that come from a general practice accepted as law; 
treaty law is an agreement in a formal document such as the UN Charter. Like any treaty, it 
is legally binding on all parties that have ratified the document. Those provisions of the 
Charter, therefore, that impose obligations relating to the use of force constitute binding 
treaty law for those states.110 Furthermore, it has been suggested that both members and 
non-members of the UN have come to regard particular norms embodied in the Charter to 
be binding customs.111 If states perceive UN norms to be authoritative and as such generally 
conform to them in their “state practice”, then there is argument to suggest these norms 
have become incorporated into customary international law applicable even to non-
members. 
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The theory behind the establishment of the UN was that the experience of the Second 
World War could not be allowed to re-occur. Allowing certain states to use force to alter 
violently the existing political and territorial status quo was not acceptable. Force was not to 
be used to gain territory, to change the government of another state or to right a past 
wrong.112 Arguably, the current situation in the Middle East could be described as Western 
states attempting to change governments and right past wrongs, through forceful means if 
necessary. Indeed there is worrying evidence that suggests President Bush wanted to 
achieve just this. Prior to the adoption of Resolution 678, ‘Bush saw a Council authorization 
of force as an opportunity to institute a ‘new world order and a long era of peace’.’113 
Instituting a new world order is clearly outside the realms of the Resolution, indeed outside 
the realm of the UN Charter and a realist interpretation. It would only be those natural law 
theorists who may argue that there is a moral obligation or divine right to ensure world 
peace through forceful means. 
Charter Framework 
Included within the main aims of the UN Charter are; the maintenance of peace and security 
(Article 1) and the prohibition on the use of force, except in certain circumstances (Article 
2(4)).  
State sovereignty is fundamental within the UN Charter. It must be protected in pursuit of 
the main aims of the Charter, primarily the maintenance of peace and security. Art. 2(1) 
states: ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.’ The Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ Ser. A No. 10 explains state jurisdiction stating: ‘it [a 
state] may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.’ 
Furthermore, Art. 2(7) declares: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter.’ However this is qualified with the statement: ‘but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’ Chapter VII 
of the Charter permits the UNSC to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
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necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.’114 When acting in response to ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’115 Therefore state sovereignty is a restricted 
right. It is granted in the Charter but can be withdrawn. Peace and security may have 
priority over state sovereignty if Chapter VII requirements are met. States also limit their 
sovereignty by signing treaties. If this was not the case, then there would be little point to 
having them. Controversially, the protection of human rights inevitably requires 
interference in the internal affairs of a state.116 
The exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force by states are in accordance with the 
Charter provisions contained in Chapter VII. Chapter VII is concerned with the use of force in 
circumstances where there has been a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. Chapter VII has long been the focal point of many a debate surrounding issues of 
interpretation. A key problem is the lack of definition in the Charter of which acts fall within 
the categories, such as “use of force.” It does not limit the ability of the UNSC to interpret 
any act as being one of satisfying the section. Hence, given this elasticity of meaning, the 
range of acts falling within such categories has broadened. 
The onus is on the Security Council to decide whether there has been such a “threat” or 
“act” (Article 39), and, if so, it can “authorise” the use of armed force under Article 42. 
When utilising the Charter provisions in this way, the UNSC will almost always cite 
approvingly the principles contained in Article 2(4). 
Under the Charter, states also retain the ability to act in self-defence under Article 51.117 
States’ use of force against any other State is therefore regulated by international law. 
States can only legally use force if there is a clear authorisation from the UN, or there is a 
justification for self-defence. Self-defence is permitted to protect territory from an armed 
attack against an aggressor State. For example, the initial use of force against Iraq in 1990 by 
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the coalition of 34 nation states codenamed Operation Desert Shield was clearly a case of 
self-defence to expel Iraqi troops who entered Kuwait using force. 
UN authorisation is usually found in UNSC Resolutions. However, the UNGA also has the 
power to conclude recommendations through Resolutions. The UNGA acting under the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution (GA Res. 377 (V) (1950)), can recommend that members of the 
UN take appropriate collective measures. This includes the use of armed force when 
necessary to restore international peace and security, when the UNSC is unable to make 
such a decision because of the use of the veto by a permanent member. However, a 
detailed consideration of UNGA authority is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Self-Defence 
In terms of international legal doctrine, states can legally embark upon armed force when 
acting in self-defence, that is, when a state has been the victim of an unprovoked military 
attack (aggression). There is no question that a state has the right to defend its territory 
against those identified as ‘aggressors.’ Self-defence is located in customary and treaty law. 
Custom defines self-defence as a response to an immediate and pressing threat, one which 
cannot be averted, and that it is proportional to such threat.118 Self-defence is also 
preserved by Article 51 of the Charter. There is, however, some debate as to the validity of 
anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence where no act of aggression has yet taken place but 
is feared and anticipated; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
Article 51 of the UN Charter does not discriminate between individual or collective self-
defence - where a country comes to the aid of another under attack. Either approach is 
permitted. However, such acts of defence must be in direct response to an armed attack.  
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.’ 119  
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The wording of the Article implies that an attack is under way, and as such the aim of 
further uses of force is to repel it. ‘Once the attack is over, the legal justifications for the use 
of force must be different.’120 It is an exculpatory defence for the conduct; the defending 
state was not at fault - as opposed to an excuse which concerns some culpability of the 
defendant.121 Furthermore, action taken under this auspice must be reported to the UNSC, 
and must not inhibit the authority and responsibility of this body to maintain or restore 
“international peace and security.”  
Self-defence is an essential but still problematic element of international law doctrine. It is 
necessary, as one could not imagine not being able to repel an aggressor; however the limits 
of a legalist approach to self-defence can be broken. Fletcher & Ohlin state: ‘the right of 
states to come to each other’s aid is freighted, in international law, with concerns about 
covert aggression, or coming to the aid of another and then remaining as the occupier of the 
defending country.’122 Therefore there is the possibility of an over-use of this concept by 
states, using it for their own political gain. Iraq is perhaps the best example here. In the 
initial aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the collective action could be 
described legally as “collective self-defence.” However, it is unlikely that this argument 
could extend beyond the expelling of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restoring the previous 
status quo. Self-defence by its very name does not permit regime change.  
From a positivist perspective, the initial justification for self-defence was the repelling of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Once this was achieved, any reference to self-defence would be 
redundant and hence illegal. 
UNSC authorisation 
Under the Charter, States are authorised to use force when there is a clear enabling 
Resolution from the UNSC. In order for such a Resolution to be concluded, the UNSC must 
make a decision under Article 39 of the Charter, under which there must have been a 
“threat to the peace,” “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression.” If an affirmative answer 
is deemed to exist, then the UNSC can issue binding Resolutions under Article 41 (non –
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military sanctions) and Article 42 (military sanctions).  When acting in accordance with a UN 
Resolution duly enacted under this provision, states’ use of force will be legal. Controversies 
appear in this category of ‘legal’ uses of force when states push the boundaries of the 
enabling resolution such as the ‘continuing authority’ theory of Resolution 678. 
Historically, the original idea in the UN Charter under Article 43 was that the UN would have 
a standing army. This army would be at the disposal of the UN to carry out the terms of an 
enabling Resolution. However, following the failure to conclude such agreements which 
would have created such a force, states enforce UN Resolutions through a decentralised 
system. It has become a recognised and legal use of the Charter to enable ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ to act on behalf of the UN. The use of force in Iraq has been provided predominately 
by the UK and US, who have (or have not in some cases) acted as a coalition with UN 
approval through an enabling resolution. 
When reading a UN Resolution, it is now established practice that the term ‘all necessary 
means’ is an authorisation for states to use force. Be that as it may ‘the term ‘all necessary 
means’ is as much a limiting factor as a validating effect: action taken under the 
authorisation really has to be demonstrably ‘necessary’ for the achievement of the purpose 
laid down.’123 If action is necessary to achieve a UNSC objective then this would be within 
the legality of international law. Blokker124 argues that such delegation still needs to respect 
the authority and overall responsibility of the UNSC for maintaining peace and security. In 
contrast to Blokker’s argument, this phraseology does not seem to have inhibited States in 
finding the necessary authority to act. The use of force in Iraq has consistently been cited as 
being within the spirit of Resolution 678.  However, ‘being within the spirit’ in the sense of 
falling within the scope of the underlying purpose, would be deemed insufficient from a 
legalist approach. As in Iraq, the use of force is far beyond what was anticipated by the 
UNSC; and hence legalists will assure us of its illegality. 
The decentralised system and lack of interpretive guidelines leaves the gates open for a 
varied interpretation of UN Resolutions by states. The argument put forward by the USA and 
UK governments for continued action in Iraq is based on the ‘continuing’ theory of the 
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enabling Resolutions. Resolution 678 was cited as the legal basis for the airstrikes of January 
1993, on the grounds that the violation of Resolution 687 re-triggered the original mandate 
given to Coalition states. The UK repeated this claim in February 1998. However, although 
not without ambiguity, Resolution 678 of November 1990 related to the initial use of force 
against Iraq carried out in 1991. Arguably, any subsequent threats or uses of force needed to 
be mandated afresh.125 Furthermore, in 2003, the USA and UK once again relied on the 
resurrection of Resolutions 678 and 687 - combined with Resolution 1441 - to commence 
military operations against Iraq.126 These arguments clearly fall outside the strict legality 
doctrine, and thus will be debated at more length in the next Chapter. 
Problems of Interpretation  
There has been considerable academic debate over the interpretation of the meaning and 
scope of provisions relating to the use of force. Firstly, the Charter does not define what 
should or could constitute a ‘threat or use of force.’ Is this purely armed force, or can it be 
interpreted more broadly? Secondly, as suggested by Arend & Beck: ‘what is a use of force 
against the ‘territorial integrity’ or ‘political independence’ of another state, or ‘inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations?’’127 These broad statements are not further 
clarified within the Charter, and it is the responsibility of individual states to interpret their 
meaning and scope in concrete situations.  
Arguably a rigid interpretation of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ could 
allow a violation to have not taken place unless a portion of the State’s territory is 
permanently lost.128 From a broader view, it could be argued that any use of force without 
justification on another states’ territory is an illegal use of force for the purposes of this 
definition. Furthermore, it would be a hard task to calculate all purposes either consistent or 
inconsistent with the UN unless the section is referring to those specifically listed in the 
Charter. The UN is constantly evolving, producing documents to match with the world order 
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at a particular point in time. Therefore, one would have to codify all the documents to 
present day to establish a full list of consistencies or inconsistencies. 
Additionally, there is much controversy as to the issue of pre-emptive self-defence. Must a 
state wait until an attack has actually been launched before being in a position to protect 
itself? If self-defence is an inherent right and the purpose of the Article was not to restrict 
the pre-existing customary right, can it ever be extended if state practice conforms? A rigid, 
legalist  interpretation would suggest that until the Charter is amended to reflect such a 
change then not, but on a broader, realist, interpretation if state practice would establish a 
new customary law permitting pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence then it would be 
possible. Finally, the requirements for states to engage in acts of collective self-defence are 
not clear. 129 Article 51 permits collective action, but does not specify any limits. Therefore, 
this could be described as a creative ambiguity that leaves wide discretionary options open 
for States to interpret the provisions in their favour.  
The term “aggression” is used in the UN Charter, it refers to an ‘act of aggression’ and 
‘preventing or stopping aggression’ but it does not have a specific definition not even under 
International Criminal law post Nuremberg. The closest identification is that detailed in 
UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) which states:  
 
‘Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’  
 
This definition is broad but corresponds with the main aims of the UN Charter detailed in 
Article 2. The UNSC has on many occasions used the term aggression to seem to mean ‘with 
a use of force’ and this would be consistent in linking the definition provided above with the 
aims of the UN as a whole. However, this is the authors own interpretation of the issue, and 
highlights the difficulties that any academic or member of the UNSC would have in coming 
to a firm conclusion. 
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The threat or use of force is also problematic. Does this encompass pure ‘aggression’ 
or could knowledge that a state is preparing an attack, be encompassed? The text of the 
Charter specifically refers to ‘international relations.’ Hence, any internal use of force is not 
covered. This is perhaps a limiting factor, as it would be wise to allow states to come to the 
aid of one involved in civil war. The South Sudanese conflict beginning in 2011 already has a 
death toll at over 15,000.130  The prohibition on the use of force is contained in both treaty 
and customary law, therefore the breadth of interpretation is wide, ranging from a fixed 
treaty based rule to a more flexible customary rule. Furthermore, Corten describes how 
both rules can have a flexible or restrictive nature.131 Therefore, a legalist approach in this 
regard could interpret the law across a wide spectrum as custom is as much a part of 
international law as treaties. What is further problematic, is whether a ‘new’ custom, is 
accepted as custom throughout the globe.  
Strikingly, self-defence prior to the Charter was not defined. It was frequently 
referred to, but rarely sufficiently explained. Therefore, the extent to which self-defence 
could be utilised was unclear. It was assumed that if a state was attacked, it had the right to 
defend itself, but the parameters of the right were uncertain. Article 51 gives some 
restriction to the right by defining it as a response to an ‘armed attack.’ However, the exact 
limitations of the right can still be problematic. Armed attack is not defined further, 
therefore leaving open a gap for interpretation.  Arend & Beck suggest, ‘is this different to 
an act of aggression’ found in Chapter VII?132 The solution has not been decided but it would 
be sensible to apply the definition from 1974 for its definitive nature. 
Sovereignty is the intentional independence of a state that has the power to execute 
all necessary measures within its own borders to govern itself without fear of lawful foreign 
intervention. It could be considered the traditional lynchpin of international law and 
international relations. Therefore, any State using force, even against another deemed a 
hostile state, as falling into the status of an outlaw of humanity, can come under scrutiny 
when doing so without clear legal authority. 
                                                          
130 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/world/africa/new-estimate-sharply-raises-death-toll-in-south-sudan.html?_r=1 ; 
http://www.acleddata.com/?s=sudan accessed 20th August 2104. 
131 Oliver Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate’ [2006] 16 European 




Prior to 1945, the use of force was perfectly lawful and title to territory acquired through 
conquest was quite common. This, in effect, was a right to war. However, from the moment 
an “aggressive” use of force became unlawful (after the adoption of the Charter) it has been 
impossible for a state to acquire title to territory by conquest. For example, whether or not 
Iraq had a valid claim to parts of Kuwait’s territory, it could not obtain sovereignty over it by 
force of arms.133  
In CND v UK134 the UK House of Lords had the opportunity to clarify the extent to which 
Resolution 1441 (2002) permitted the use of force beyond the enabling Resolution. CND 
sought judicial review as to whether the resolution authorised States to take military action 
in the event of non-compliance with the terms of the resolution by Iraq. This case declared 
that a decision to go to war cannot legally be challenged. Lord Justice Brown stated: ‘The 
court is unequipped to judge such merits or demerits and where in any event respect is 
properly due to the democratically elected government which is answerable politically for 
its actions.’ The House of Lords refused to consider judicial review: ‘How could our 
assumption of jurisdiction here be regarded around the world as anything other than an 
exorbitant arrogation of adjudicative power?’135  
This case shows the continuing power of doctrines of state sovereignty and prerogatives 
that fall outside the realm of judicial review and legal challenge. 
Conclusion 
The analysis in this section has highlighted the problems inherent in a legalist analysis. That 
is, the rigidity of such a doctrine and how it faces challenge once the nature and scope of 
interpretative issues are properly appreciated. If one follows a legalist perspective then the 
law is unable to adapt to changing situations. What was envisaged when the UN Charter, 
may be obsolete or unworkable – such as Article 43 arrangements, and thus it would be 
wise to leave the option for a wider interpretation of the law. It would be sensible to allow 
interpretations of international law to reflect the changing degrees of consensus of states 
and the aims and objectives of the UNSC. WMD were not on the agenda when the UN 
Charter was written, this is clearly a huge development within the world states. ‘To deprive 
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the international community of a reasoned basis for using force threatens Charter interests 
and values, rather than supporting and advancing them.’136 Therefore a strict positivist 
position is unwelcome in the contemporary era. Without adaptation of international law to 
meet modern needs, the outcome would be that many uses of force would be ‘illegal’ and 
therefore warrant sanctioning; with or without the ability of the UNSC to do so. 
This Chapter has explained the meaning and scope of legal rules in “their strict sense” as 
legalism dictates. However, given its limitations, the next Chapter will look at law in action. 
How is the law on armed force applied in practical situations, and how could this be is 
beneficial for the international community? It will seek to identify pragmatic solutions in 
preference to a rigidly, positivist approach. It will consider the issues raised by the 
application of rules and principles to real cases of armed conflict from a contextual 
perspective upon international law. In order to discuss these viable options, the questions 
that will be considered are: What was the reason for intervention? Why was military force 
the only option? And what did the military force hope to achieve? These questions could all 
have an effect on the legitimacy of any use of force. If the use of force which does not fit 
neatly into one of the legal provisions relating to armed force meets the wider aims and 
objectives of a previous Resolution on the situation or the aims of the UNSC,137 then there 
could be a claim for ‘legitimate’ use of the force. In a sense was it ‘morally’ right to use force 
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Do states act legally - or not - when using force? 
 
This Chapter will discuss the legality, or the absence of such, in states use of armed force 
through the use of case studies. The intention is to establish whether states act within the 
ambit of the most viable interpretation of relevant international law when using force 
against an aggressive or hostile state. 
This chapter will now consider the justifications given by states when engaging in armed 
force and as such the legality of those justifications. This chapter will conclude with an 
evaluation of the force used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. The next chapter will continue 
with a discussion of the wider legitimacy of those actions which are technically ‘illegal’. 
There is firstly an important distinction to be made, that is the difference between jus ad 
bellum – the lawfulness of war, and jus in bello – the proper conduct of warfare regulated 
by the laws and customs of war including war crimes offences. This thesis is concerned 
mainly with the former, the jus ad bellum, although the concept of “aggression” that forms 
part of the latter will have some relevance. Is there a strict legal rule for any given use of 
force? And, if not, what are the wider justifications used by states? 
As the major “subjects” of international law, States need to represent the international 
order because the order is itself an interstate-state in which treaty-making and custom are 
key sources. The role of states in ratifying treaty law and their actions that amount to 
customary international law are the main sources of law. Therefore, it is paramount that 
they adhere to the principles and rules of international law. International law recognises 
two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, action authorised by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and self-defence contained in Article 51. 
In reality, state sovereignty is not as clear cut as the wording of the Charter would suggest. 
In a literal sense, no intervention is permitted, except in applying Chapter VII. However, the 
idea of “humanitarian intervention” could provide an avenue for not respecting sovereignty 
in its entirety. If an intervention has good cause or legitimate justifications but is not strictly 
legal should derogation from state sovereignty be permitted? An example is the current 
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action in the Middle East. This use of force is supposedly designed to make the countries 
safer, and expel ‘rogue’ governments. Nevertheless ‘no matter how big or small, 
superpower or rogue regime, each state’s sovereign ‘privacy’ is, at least in principle, to be 
protected.’138 Boas argument is questionable as he uses the qualifying phrase ‘in principle’ 
therefore suggesting that at some point it may be acceptable to intervene. This author 
would argue that ‘that point’ is where there are justifications on the grounds of humanity. 
The real problem with the idea of state sovereignty is the difference in equality of states. All 
states should be equal under traditional theories of international law. However, the size of 
armies, nuclear and chemical weapons and ultimately power all lead towards a sense of 
inequality. Furthermore, the current UNSC consists of five permanent members who 
ultimately have hierarchical power over all other states. The inequality of states inevitably 
supports a realist interpretation of international law which suggests international law is a 
part of international relations. Political realism in particular accepts that states will act as 
politics dictate thus acknowledging that those more powerful states can yield authority over 
weaker states that do not have the ability to have a substantial influence in the international 
arena.  
The UNSC can legally authorise the use of military action by states through Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Article 42 is the authorising section, which states:  
‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’ 
Individual and collective self-defence are a legal exception to the prohibition on the use of 
force, now contained within Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 uses the term ‘armed 
attack. ’ Therefore, a state is only permitted to act under Article 51 if there has already been 
a state-sponsored strike: that is, an “act of aggression” or “use of force” from another state. 
This is in contrast to the rule pre 1945; Brownlie writing in 1963 in reference to the Kellogg-
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Briand Pact refers to the ‘necessary reaction against the use or threat of force.139 It would 
seem that the mere ‘threat’ of force such as military preparations on a state border has 
been deliberately omitted from the UN Charter. 
States might try to justify their intervention under one of the headings discussed 
below. This would not automatically make the action lawful in a legalist sense; however 
supporters of realism and natural law theory could find legitimacy in the use of force with 
good justifications. Chapter VII action and self-defence are undoubtedly lawful; the other 
justifications are not as clear. This chapter will now consider each justification and its legal 
status in detail, continuing with an evaluation of the force used in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libya. The next chapter will continue with the morality of those actions which are 
technically ‘illegal’.  
Interestingly, Roberts questions the terminology ‘technically’. ‘Unilateral uses of 
force are not illegal because they breach a technical rule; they are illegal because they 
breach a fundamental Charter obligation.’140 The “illegal” nature of the use of force can be 
vast, ranging from the NATO action in Kosovo which had no basis in international law, to the 
action in Libya 2011 - which merely went beyond Resolution 1973 in order to bring about a 
desired result supported by the UN. Therefore ‘technically’ in this thesis refers to those uses 
of force which might be illegal but which are still within the spirit or objectives of the agreed 
use of force. Furthermore, ‘technically illegal’ action in Kosovo was not condemned, nor 
were sanctions applied. Therefore, this author would argue that even though NATO applied 
an illegal use of force, it did not ‘breach a fundamental Charter obligation.’ 
Whereas Chapter two considered solely the legal element of uses of force in 
principle and on paper, this thesis now considers the use of force in action. 
Anticipatory self-defence 
Historically, it was generally assumed that customary law permitted anticipatory action in 
face of imminent danger. The Caroline Case of 1837 is an example of this where it was 
argued: ‘A necessity of self-defence and self-preservation, gave them the right to destroy 
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the ‘piratical’ vessel within US territory.’141 The key terms being ‘self-preservation’ and 
‘necessity,’ which could be assumed here to permit anticipatory action when there is a 
known threat against the security of the state. However, in order to strike first the necessity 
of self-defence must be: ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation.’142 Necessity must also be determined in light of the 
circumstances; there must be no other reasonable alternative to avoiding the threat other 
than armed force.143 The threat must also be both imminent and extreme, and involve 
impending destruction.144 It is the use of the word ‘impending’ that suggests anticipatory 
action is permissible. It does not require an attack to have taken place.  
Presently, the issue of anticipatory action is perhaps redundant. It has been debated at 
length in international law scholarship and cases. Hence, the founders of the UN Charter 
could have taken the opportunity to address it, if they had so wished. This would assume 
that it was purposefully omitted from the text. However, increasingly it has become 
questionable whether there is a customary law right of states to engage in anticipatory self-
defence. The text of Article 51 ’armed attack’ would suggest a negative answer to the 
question. The ICJ in the Nicaragua145 case did not take the opportunity to specify the 
content of the customary rules referred to in Article 51; in particular, whether it included 
the old rule providing for a right to anticipatory self-defence.146 Controversially, maintaining 
a rule against anticipatory action would ‘protect the aggressor’s right to the first stroke.’147 
Furthermore, Article 51 does not ‘impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence.’ Inherently, customary law permitted anticipatory uses of force. Brownlie 148 does 
not agree, giving a vague reasoning that any argument to the contrary is either unconvincing 
or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence. By contrast, Corten argues ‘a strict reading of 
Article 51 is no longer tenable in the face of modern terrorism and aggression.’149 It must be 
remembered that Brownlie was writing over fifty years ago and hence Cortens argument is 
perhaps the more plausible in the current context. The proliferance of WMD and terrorist 
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groups could mean that anticipatory action is not only a possibility but is an essential 
element of modern international law. Chemical warfare may mean that time is of the 
essence, and a state simply cannot wait for an attack to be launched, if it does so, it will be 
not be a state in a position to repel the attack. 
Brownlie uses the terms anticipatory and preventive interchangeably in his text. Yet this is in 
itself problematic as it would appear there is no significant distinction between the two. 
Anticipatory self-defence would suggest that an attack in foreseeable, a preventive use of 
force is to destroy the possibility of an attack. The two categories are closely related, but 
there is some distinction. Preventive action would suggest that an attack is only a potential, 
thus leading this argument to be weaker than anticipatory action which would imply that 
there is evidence to suggest an attack is likely. Although not identical neither is clearly 
identified as legal within the UN Charter. 
If armed force is launched before the attack is ‘imminent,’ then there must be a 
determination of the certainty of attack; and there must be a consideration of questions of 
“proportionality.”150 The ‘defendant’ state must have a degree of confidence that armed 
force is to be used against them, however, at what level? WMD were identified as the 
reason for using force in Iraq. Yet the claims were still ill-founded. Therefore, one cannot be 
entirely certain of an attack until that attack has been launched. In addition, any force used 
to repel an ‘impending’ attack must be proportional. If the attack has not been launched, 
the amount of armed force needed may not be clear. Furthermore, if the ‘proof’ of attack is 
ill-founded, could self-defence from the defending state be considered “aggression” which 
the initiator state could then lawfully respond to with military force? It is a problematic 
circle. Fletcher & Ohlin reiterate this by stating: ‘If every state prosecuted its strategic 
interests by launching pre-emptive attacks, the world would indeed collapse back into a 
state of nature.’151 This is an interesting insight, and suggests that if every state responded 
to ‘ideas’ by launching attacks then the world would become a place of lawlessness.  
Terrorism is a use of force that has led to states wanting to take pre-emptive action. The 
dangerousness of WMD means that a state may not have time to wait until an attack has 
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been launched against them.152 Accordingly, is it possible that preventive or anticipatory 
self-defence now needs to be addressed by the UNSC and incorporated into the UN 
Charter? Since August 1990 there has not been a determination of the existence of a breach 
of the peace by the UNSC. Instead, it has identified a ‘threat to the peace’. Could this lead to 
a doctrine of pre-emption being developed? To name but a few: Resolution 1973 (2011) of 
17 March 2011, referred to the situation in Libya as a “continued threat to international 
peace and security.” In 2008 and 2009 the Council also determined that the situations in 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Sudan and Darfur continued to constitute threats to international 
peace and security.153  In 2004-2007 the Council identified certain generic threats to peace 
and security, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation 
and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.154 This is important because such 
identifications of ‘a threat to the peace’ are key arguments in the development of 
anticipatory self-defence as a legal doctrine. If the UNSC are prepared to accept a “threat”, 
then they must also identify when such a threat can be avoided. Arguably, it would be 
absurd to suggest that a threat is real, but that nothing can be done until that threat is 
launched, particularly with reference to WMD. 
The concept of anticipatory self-defence was supported by the UN High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change. This panel is clear that the threat must be imminent and 
nothing short of this should suffice. The report appears to give support to the position that a 
state can use force to prevent an imminent attack on its own territory.155 In light of the 
above commentary, this could be a welcomed addition. 
Humanitarian Intervention 
Another argument used by states for intervening with armed force is that of humanitarian 
intervention. Humanitarian intervention is the use of military force on the territory of a 
state, without that states consent, and with the goal of protecting innocent victims of large-
scale atrocities. ‘The issue of humanitarian intervention arises in cases where a government 
has turned the machinery of the state against its own people, or where the state has 
collapsed into lawlessness.’156 An example of this is the ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces in 
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Kosovo, 1999. In August 2014 a ‘humanitarian crises’ was described in Iraq.157 Civilians 
trapped on a mountain top with limited to no food and water supplies, prompted the USA 
to enter the country for the third time with armed force. 
‘Humanitarian intervention’ has a long history. Three European powers, England, France and 
Russia intervened in Greece in 1827 to stop massacres by Turkey, and France intervened 
again in Syria in 1860 to stop the killings of Maronite Christians. Various European powers 
intervened in defence of Christians also in Crete (1866-1868), the Balkans (1875-1878) and 
Macedonia (1903-1908).158 As Brownlie states:  
‘The classical writers on the law of nations stated in very general terms that a war to 
punish injustice and those guilty of crimes was a just war. By the end of the nineteenth 
century the majority of publicists admitted that a right of humanitarian intervention 
existed.159  
This theory links a ‘just’ war with that of a humanitarian war. The two ideas could be linked 
but are not necessarily so. A ‘just’ war could extend far beyond the realms of humanity by a 
state seeking ‘justice’; this would share beliefs with natural law theory. Zolo also argues that 
‘humanitarian interference’ could be ‘another incarnation of the doctrine of just war: an 
intolerable ethical and legal swindle, or, at best, an irresponsible self-delusion.’160 In 
contrast, humanity taken by itself is not as broad as Zolo might suggest. The use of force to 
protect citizens may be termed ‘just’ in that it is the right action to take, but this does not 
mean that it will revert back to the historical idea of engaging in a ‘just war.’ 
This second point made by Brownlie acknowledges more closely the link to 
‘humanitarianism’. However, as with the present day, there is no further definition of the 
extent of the parameters of waging such a ‘humanitarian’ war. 
A state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and excessively cruel treatment of 
those within its power, whether nationals or not, was regarded as having made itself liable 
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to action by any state which was prepared to intervene. The doctrine was inherently 
vague.’161   
Brownlie  offers no further explanation. In one respect, his idea is clear: humanitarian 
suffering warrants action, but the extent to which action is permitted is not. This theory is 
largely replicated in the present day. There is no succinct definition and no clear legal 
boundaries when it is not authorised by the UNSC.162 
In Nicaragua163 the ICJ ruled against humanitarian intervention under specified conditions 
whilst recognising it had a legal basis in the remainder if pursued consistently and in a 
principled way: ‘If the provision of "humanitarian assistance" is to escape condemnation as 
an intervention in the internal affairs of another state, it must be limited to the purposes 
hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, and above all be given without discrimination’ 
(paragraph 2). The practice of the Red Cross is to deliver food, water, shelter and medical 
aid. The Red Cross does not adhere to the practice of armed force stating that it should only 
‘sound the alarm’ and will not use force to bring an end to hostilities.164 
This case shows the two-sided nature of humanitarian intervention. Predominately, the 
argument against humanitarian intervention is its inconsistent nature. Without a clear 
doctrine it is not applied consistently and the political realist would assume that this is 
because of the intent of the powerful states to realise only their own politically defined 
national interests. However, the morality of intervention in states persecuting citizens is 
obvious.165 
Humanitarian intervention can be based on a wider reading of Article 2(4) that 
acknowledges the necessity of temporary violations to territorial sovereignty to prevent the 
loss of life.166 The UK explicitly claimed to be acting under the doctrine of humanitarian 
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intervention when justifying its actions in Northern Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999.167 
However the argument in support of the establishment of safe havens and no-fly zones [in 
Iraq] was based on Security Council Resolution 688. It was not adopted under Chapter VII 
UN Charter and did not include the phrase ‘all necessary means’ but did implicitly authorise 
a restricted use of force for protecting the Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq.168 Along similar lines, it 
was argued with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in 
Kosovo that the NATO bombardments could be justified on the basis of UNSC Resolution 
1199 of 23 September 1998 (SCOR 53rd Year 13, Para. 16). This measure provides that the 
Council would consider additional measures if the ones provided for in UNSC Resolution 
1160 of 31 March 1998 (SCOR 53rd Year 10) did not lead to the desired results, such as the 
defeat of violence and terrorism.169 NATO also argued that the ethnic cleansing carried out 
by Serbian forces was a humanitarian catastrophe.170 Arguably the clear pronouncement to 
be acting under UNSC resolutions weakens the reasoning for the emergence of the doctrine. 
This is because those states are not specifically referring to the doctrine, developing it into 
customary practice; rather they are more concerned with present law.  
The US has been more cautious in its reasoning, referring repeatedly to ‘humanitarian 
concerns’ but never explicitly claiming the existence of a customary rule thus further 
weakening any potential argument. The USA also admitted (perhaps by accident) ‘that 
besides humanitarian reasons, the war had to do with the security, economic prosperity and 
international prestige of their countries.’171  Germany, gave its consent to the Kosovo 
intervention only on the condition that it was made clear that this was not a precedent for 
further action.172  Highly critical of the doctrine is the argument by Zolo that the USA must 
‘invent’ new forms of legitimate uses of force in order to promote its hegemonic stability.173 
‘Realists argue that intervention [in Kosovo] was ultimately about upholding the credibility 
of NATO.’174 However, this argument is flawed; the action also restrained Milosevic’s action. 
The Independent Commission found the action to be illegal but legitimate by stating: ‘the 
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Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues 
had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority 
population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.’175 It is arguable 
the action in Libya (2011) could be classified as ‘illegal but legitimate’ in that the use of force 
from a realist perspective restrained the rule of a dictator and liberated the civilian 
population thus achieving a pragmatic effect. However, no such declaration has been made, 
albeit there has been little question over the ‘legality’ of the use of force in this instance. 
Furthermore, any action that may be taken against Syria for the use of chemical weapons, 
without UNSC authority could fall into this category. Notably, no armed force since Kosovo 
has officially gained the title ‘illegal but legitimate.’ 
Paust’s view of the Kosovo intervention is interesting. He states that the action was legal 
under Article 52 of the UN Charter as ‘they promoted peace, security, self-determination, 
and human rights in the area.’176 Which he rightly assumes are values of the UN.177 
However, Article 52 refers specifically to the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’. If a dispute 
cannot be rectified pacifically then it must be referred to the UNSC. Therefore Paust’s 
argument is flawed in this sense, as the intervention in Kosovo involved the use of armed 
force. 
The legality issue of humanitarian intervention has not been confirmed. There is certainly no 
provision within the UN Charter for humanitarian intervention. Yet Zolo suggests that the 
right to employ armed force to counter acts of “aggression” threatening peace is being 
replaced by the principle or rhetoric of “the defence of human rights.”178 It could be a 
dangerous tool as states may use it as a self-serving instrument to authorise their own gains. 
On the other hand, it could be described as inhumane to leave citizens suffering in a state 
where their own governments could or did not want to help them. Nevertheless history has 
repeatedly evidenced such inaction. In a critical vein, humanitarian intervention is a phrase 
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used to gather consensus for war, which almost inevitably will have harsh consequences on 
both sides.179 
However, in practice, the realists are right to recognise that the appeal to HI is a highly 
selective tool. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 which is clearly a humanitarian catastrophe 
had no interest for intervention from states. The current problems in 2013 with Somali 
piracy have attracted attention because of the oil interests, however clear humanitarian 
interest does not always attract attention. ‘The end of the U.S. war in Vietnam led [a] form 
of piracy, aimed at the mass migration of people from Vietnam. These pirate attacks were 
largely ignored by regional governments, which hoped to stem the flow of refugees.’180 It is 
this selectivity and thus unreliability of intervention that makes humanitarian rhetoric sound 
one-sided, hypocritical or even false.181 
In light of this arbitrary and self-interested selectivity, humanitarian intervention can be 
described as an: ‘excuse or mitigating circumstance rather than an exculpatory defence.’182 
It cannot be exculpatory as the intervening state still had the intention to intervene with 
armed force. There was a reason for the use of force, such as a humanitarian catastrophe, a 
very good reason, but this does not mean that the intervener did not intend it. It means the 
intervener had ‘good’ humanitarian motives for intervention. Therefore from natural law 
theory this excuse or justification for a particular use of force would almost certainly be 
deemed legitimate through its moral implications.  Realists are also likely to argue in favour 
of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention through its pragmatic effects; that is the 
relief of humanitarian suffering. 
Responsibility to Protect 
The responsibility to protect (R2P) in its present form has become a live issue since 2005 
when it was unanimously adopted at the World Summit. Prior to this in September 2000 the 
Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) to discuss the issue. The World Summit outcome was that R2P would 
now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations. 
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Presently only the UNSC is authorised to use this doctrine. It does not legalise unilateral 
intervention, therefore it is subject to the political dimensions of the Security Council. 
However, it has been suggested that the use of the veto should be restricted when the 
UNSC are discussing issues falling within this doctrine. The responsibility to protect involves 
the ideas of prevention, reaction and rebuilding. ‘The substance of the responsibility to 
protect is the provision of life-supporting protection and assistance to populations at 
risk.’183 Arguably, military intervention is the most severe option, only warranted when 
there is: ‘large-scale loss of life due to deliberate state action, neglect or inability to act, or a 
failed state situation; or large-scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.’184  This doctrine is closely 
linked to humanitarian intervention, they certainly overlap. It endorses similar ideas about 
protecting the citizens of hostile governments and states.  
Protection of nationals abroad 
Legal scholars, as well as states, have long disagreed on the compatibility with the UN 
Charter of the so-called ‘protection of nationals’ doctrine. Unwelcomingly it is not legally 
defined but there are recommendations for its use. This doctrine suggests that states are 
allowed to forcibly intervene in other countries for the protection of their own endangered 
nationals abroad, subject to the following (cumulative) conditions: (i) there is an imminent 
threat of injury to nationals; (ii) a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign 
to protect them and; (iii) the action of the intervening state is strictly confined to the 
objective of protecting its nationals.185 
It is arguable that state intervention to protect nationals is a form of self-defence.186 This is 
seen as the ‘better view’.187 It could be assumed that it is seen in this way because of the 
legal nature of self-defence through customary law and the UN Charter188 and the non-legal 
nature of the protection of nationals.  States could interpret the protection of nationals as 
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an extension of the defence of the state through their citizenship. Realists would agree with 
the pragmatic results of using self-defence in this way. However, if international relations 
dictate that there is a doctrine of the protection of nationals, then it would make sense to 
implement that into international law to ensure clarity on the use of the doctrine. As it is 
from a legalist perspective it would seem to demonstrate the non-legal nature of such use 
of force. 
The Israeli rescue of citizens from a hijacked plane on the territory of Uganda in 1976 
(Operation Entebbe) was declared by the UK and USA as a legal use of force. Though only 
specifically referred to as self-defence by Western Germany, other European countries 
praised the action. The UK and USA declared that it was not a violation of the territorial 
integrity or political independence of Israel. The purpose of the intervention by Israel was to 
rescue it’s nationals from an Air France plane that had been hijacked by two Palestinian and 
two German nationals. However many other states rejected the idea and saw the action as a 
breach of Article 2(4).189 This reiterates the idea that states are not in agreement about 
widening the scope of individual action. It reiterates the fears of expanding the resort to 
unilateral use of force, even when there is a justifiable reason for intervention.190 On the 
other hand, the support Israel received from advocates highlights the ‘persuasive power of a 
well-presented and demonstrated case.’191 
This argument exemplifies the alarm of weaker states, but also the clear “humanitarian 
advantage” to allowing such use of force. Brownlie adds to the negative part of this 
argument, suggesting that forcible intervention to protect nationals is open to abuse, and is 
itself unlawful. 192 This reiterates the problems with state assistance when it is in their 
national interest. 
Despite this, in a similar vein to humanitarian intervention, it would be unwelcome to 
suggest that a state cannot protect its nationals who are experiencing harm abroad. 
Arguably, if a state uses force against another to protect nationals, then they are breaching 
the national sovereignty of the target state, which is a central normative element of the UN 
system. However, the doctrine only applies when the target state is at war, and therefore, 
particularly if the target state is the ‘aggressor state,’ it would be wise to permit a 
                                                          
189 Gideon Boas, Public International Law – Contemporary Principles and Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 315.  
190 ibid. 
191 ibid 316; Thomas M Franck, Recourse to Force: state Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press 2002) 85. 
192 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 1963) 301. 
52 
 
temporary derogation of sovereignty. One could assume from this argument that if 
protection of nationals is a humanitarian concern, and self-defence is not a legal possibility, 
then intervening states will nevertheless use force based on humanitarian grounds. The 
argument above in relation to humanitarian intervention would then be relevant here. It 
would be logical to assume that intervening states will always find a justification for action 
regardless of any legal basis. 
In order to apply the law to factual circumstances there will be a case-study analysis. 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have been chosen as the studies as they span the 1990’s 
through to present day, this allows for a comparison across the decades. Iraq is well 
documented and sets the scene for the next generation use of force. This section will 
highlight the problems with a restrictive legalist approach to this area of law, and how states 
have begun to justify their actions from a realist or cosmopolitan perspective. 
 
Iraq 1990-1998 
The 1991 Gulf War was a war about restoration of Kuwaiti sovereign territory and 
continuing western access to oil reserves in response to an attack by Iraq. 193 
The initial authorisation to use force against Iraq in 1990 was only the second time in which 
the UNSC ‘authorised’ states to take collective action on its behalf. The first time was the 
use of force against Korea in 1950.194 Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 authorised 
under Chapter VII, those member states cooperating with Kuwait to employ ‘all necessary 
means’ to uphold and implement Resolution 660. By 27 February 1991 the Iraqi forces were 
routed and Kuwait liberated. Once Iraq accepted all relevant Council Resolutions later that 
day, President Bush declared a cessation of hostilities.195 Therefore the initial action against 
Iraq in 1990 has a clear, sound basis in international law and does not need further 
discussion.   
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The no-fly zones imposed after the cease-fire in April and May 1991 and the attack against 
the country in 1998 do not have a clear (if any) legal basis. Western States, with the U.S at 
the fore, threatened the use of force against Iraq in February and November of 1998. The 
two states acted on these threats between 16 and 19 December 1998. The airstrikes 
proposed and carried out were directed solely at enforcing the disarmament provisions of 
UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) which Iraq had undoubtedly not complied with; however, this 
does not necessarily mean that such uses or threats of force were necessarily lawful.196 The 
argument put forward by the coalition was a ‘continuing’ authority based on the non-
compliance with Resolution 678. If this was the correct position, when would resolution 678 
have become inoperative without an express statement from the UNSC?197 This would seem 
to be a bizarre position. Resolution 678 cannot realistically be used as the legal basis for 
threats or uses of force subsequent to the formal ceasefire in Resolution 687. Resolution 
687 stated that the UNSC: ‘Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further 
steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure 
peace and security in the area.’ Therefore, the UNSC quite clearly affirm that they will be 
responsible for any future decisions concerning the situation in Iraq.  
The UK and USA also interpreted Resolution 949 as giving them authorisation to use force in 
the event of further non-compliance by Iraq.198 Resolution 949 again condemned the Iraqi 
action, but again stated that the UNSC remain ‘actively seized of the matter.’199 The UNSC 
once again had the opportunity to legalise any use of force, but decided against. Iraq pulled 
back its army in this instance rendering the debate moot; 200 however it is important to note 
that the intention from the coalition was prominent. 
The ‘illegal’ nature of the use of force is further exemplified by the failure of the USA and 
the UK to secure an enabling resolution against Iraq in June 1996 and again November 1997. 
The UNSC had ample opportunity to legalise the use of force and failed to do so. China and 
Russia may have been a threat to using the veto as they tend to support pro-sovereignty, 
they were not at ease with the way in which NATO action in Kosovo was implemented 
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without UNSC authorisation and both challenged humanitarian intervention.201  However, is 
not the purpose of the UN to act on behalf of all states? If two states are willing to take 
coalition action if they cannot achieve what they want individually, then the role of the UN 
to authorise ‘legal’ armed force is weakened. ‘Indeed, it is generally felt that the war for 
Kosovo speeded up the decline of the United Nations’ authority and role, a process that had 
started in the early 1990s.’202 
Resolution 1154 (2nd March 1998) appears to add to the ‘illegality’ of armed force. The 
Resolution did not contain the necessary phraseology to warrant armed force, and the last 
paragraph stated the Council will ‘ensure implementation of the resolution.’ It would seem 
apparent that the Council were to maintain in control, thus not authorising unilateral action. 
In a different vein, the USA argued self-defence in terms of armed force against Iraq in June 
1993. This was in response to a failed plot to assassinate President Bush. A similar argument 
was used in 1998 to justify missile attacks against Osama Bin Laden’s training camps in 
Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, in response to the bombing of US 
embassies. Although the bombing of embassies and assassination attempts should not be 
seen as marginal, Article 51 requires an armed attack against a member state; therefore a 
wide reading of Article 51 would be required to encompass these acts. 
 In summary, the attacks on Iraq in the 1990’s after the initial use of force to repel the 
armed attack, did not have a sound basis in international law, a legalist approach would not 
agree with the extended use of force. It is far reaching to assume that legality stems from a 
continuing authority of UN Resolutions, in particular as a result of the inability of the 
coalition to secure an authorising resolution. If the objective of the UNSC had been to allow 
the continued use of force, then the UNSC would have done so authoritatively. However, 
from a realist and natural law perspective the next chapter will consider whether this illegal 
use of force was practical and can be justified and if so, does it deserve the term ‘illegal’? 
Iraq 2003 
In March 2003, when the United States and the UK once again used force against Iraq, they 
relied again on the “continuing authority” of Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441. An argument 
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already advanced for the use of force in the 1990’s. Resolution 1441 did not contain any 
automaticity for the use of force, nevertheless, both the US and UK engaged in unilateral 
interpretations of 1441 as permitting them to use force against Iraq. This was based on the 
concept of ‘material breach’ and Iraq facing ‘serious’ consequences’ due to its non-
compliance. The UK subsequently argued that Resolution 1441 signified that the SC 
endorsed its position that material breach of the disarmament provisions of UNSC 
Resolutions from 687 of 3 April 1991 to 1441 suspends the operation of the cease-fire 
Resolution 687, thus allowing states to use force under the open ended provisions of 
Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990.203 This was not however what it appears the UNSC 
had in mind. Resolution 1441 did not contain the authorising words ‘all necessary means’ 
which could have been included had the Council intended the use of force. In sum, 
Resolution 1441 did not offer a clear, unambiguous mandate to engage in force. 
Furthermore, the draft resolution presented by the UK, US and Spain on 24 February 2003 
was blocked on 5 March by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Russia.204 
Therefore the use of force had not been contemplated by the UNSC. 
Arguably if there was a belief, albeit a mistaken one of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
as long as it was genuinely held, this could raise an excuse for engaging in force. However, it 
is important to note that this is an excuse, not an authorisation to engage in armed force. 
Furthermore, to be an appropriate excuse once WMD and terrorist links were not found, 
the use of force should have ceased. What ensued was a: ‘mantra of ‘regime change’ and an 
apparent sudden need for democracy in Iraq (as perceived by the coalition of the willing 
governments).’205 This is against the rule in international law that one cannot engage in 
armed force to secure regime change. Therefore, the argument that a mistaken genuine 
belief could be an excuse is redundant in this case.206 However, Dinstein would question this 
argument. He states the lack of WMD is irrelevant. The ‘material breach’ was not confined 
to dismantling WMD, it was to ‘cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.’207 Secondly 
weapons inspectors spoke of the breach, and thirdly legality or illegality must be judged at 
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the time the action is undertaken.208 This argument gives more substance to the legitimate 
use of force when it is justified for profound reasons. 
‘Washington had five great claims for the war on Iraq: the threat posed by WMD 
proliferation; the threat of international terrorism; the need to establish a beachhead 
of democratic freedoms and the rule of law in the Middle East; the need to bring 
Saddam Hussein to justice for the atrocities committed by his regime; and the duty to 
be the international community’s enforcer.’209 
The UN has acknowledged such claims but the evidence for them was weak. Therefore, are 
these reasons legitimate claims to wage a moral war? Was the removal of Saddam 
beneficial to Iraq? Thakur advises that ‘Saddam would have returned to his familiar game of 
cheat, deny, defy, retreat and live to cheat another day.’210 Nevertheless ‘Saddam had been 
successfully contained and disarmed and did not pose a clear and present danger to 
regional, world or US security.’211 Therefore there is argument to support his removal but 
the proportionality of the use of force to do this could be questioned. If the threat had been 
removed, it would be logical to suggest that a further use of force was not required. 
However, in order to suppress the claim that he would return to his usual ways or indeed to 
ensure he would not, he would have required indefinite detention or detention until he was 
rehabilitated. The practicalities of which are unknown. 
A different, but interesting angle is the suggestion that the coalition action did not need 
another UNSC Resolution. The inability to secure an authorising resolution ‘was regrettable 
from a political standpoint. But legally speaking, such an additional resolution was not 
required.’212 This logic does not require the Coalition to gain authorisation prior to the use 
of force. ‘It was for the members of the Coalition to determine whether or not to resort to 
[the use of] force in response to the ‘material breach’ of the cease-fire.’213 If accepted, then 
this would offer a legal basis for the use of armed force.  
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A vaguer argument is that ‘both in 1991 and in 2003, the Coalition acted on the basis of the 
right of collective self-defence. The exercise of that right could not be terminated by a 
cease-fire.’214 This point of view does not appear to have consensus among authors beyond 
the initial action to repel Kuwait in 1991. The right of self-defence is ‘until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’215 As 
the UNSC has repeatedly decided on the matter, this argument is weak. 
 From the argument created above, there was no clear UNSC authorisation to enter 
Iraq with armed force. This use of international law supports the realist view that a state 
with enough power can utilise the law in their own favour. The law is used as a smoke 
screen for States to engage in the action they wanted to. ‘It is now beyond doubt, that both 
geo-strategic and domestic political considerations provided the principal motives for the 
[Bush] administration’s decision to wage war against Iraq.’216 If this position is correct, and 
argument has suggested it could be, then there is a danger that the international arena is 
moving towards hegemonic rule. Vagts states: ‘A shift to HIL most specifically requires 
setting aside the norm of non-intervention into the internal affairs of states.’217 It is arguable 
that this is the current situation in the Middle East. In Iraq, the removal of Hussein was to 
purport regime change, and the same could be said of Gaddafi in Libya. This confuses the 
argument, as regime change to secure a safe standard of living for civilians could be 
welcomed, in other words regime change as part of an intervention based on humanitarian 
intervention. However Dinstein’s and Vagts’ argument would suggest that there is a darker 
side to regime change. They argue there is a shift to hegemonic international law. The use of 
force by a hegemon may purport to be acting under humanitarian intervention when in fact 
this is only one of a number of reasons. ‘The Bush Administration argues that in order to 
stop terrorism, Islamic nations must be transformed into more secular and democratic 
societies.’218  This would seem to be against Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of States. If the change is for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, 
then realism, cosmopolitanism and natural law theory would suggest that there may be a 
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valid argument, however, regime change, purely because it is different would not be 
acceptable.   
 This author would argue that a UNSC Resolution clearly stating that a use of force 
was permitted would have been ideal, but in the absence of such, prolonged armed force in 
Iraq was justified if its motives were dominated by humanitarianism. However it is 
impossible to prove what the dominating or influencing factor was, and as discussed, states 
may give one justification, but their intent was another. The “continuing resolution” 
argument is flawed in that the UNSC had the opportunity to assert authority, and did not.  
An argument based on self-defence is unlikely after the initial repelling of Iraqi troops, 
therefore a different reasoning is necessary. The most credible source of legitimisation for 
the use of force is that of humanitarian intervention. The suffering of citizens at the hands 
of Hussein meant that his removal was paramount. If the use of force achieved this goal, 
then it was a success. 
What is problematic in this analysis is the state of Iraq in present day. Has the prolonged use 
of force in the country achieved the underlying objectives of the UNSC? It is arguable that 
this is not the case.  
The country remains unstable, and citizens in 2014 are suffering at the hands of rebels. The 
removal of Hussein evicted one dictator, but the country has been unable to produce a 
democratic government in his place. Officials in the US are referring to the situation in Iraq 
as ‘humanitarian’219 and perhaps this will be the start of a campaign to re-enter the country 
with humanitarian intervention as justification. If the aims of any ‘new’ uses of force are to 
prevent genocide (as reported) and to aid civilians, then it is likely that such uses of force 
will not be condemned. It is the wider ranging, political interests of the intervening state(s) 
that could be controversial.220 The news reports of today would suggest a third Iraq war is 
now likely. 
Afghanistan from 2001 
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‘Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, International Law with regard to 
war has been defined by the UN Charter. Measured by this standard, the US-led war 
in Afghanistan has been illegal from the outset.’221  
This is a broad claim, and one which can be disproven. In the initial aftermath, there is 
clearly a case for self-defence. The US was responding directly to an armed attack against 
their territory. The perpetrator was a terrorist group, not a state; however the argument is 
based upon the harbouring in Afghanistan of terrorist organisations, in this case, the 
Taliban. 
From a political realist viewpoint, the US could have relied upon Resolution 1373 as 
authorising the use of force; however the argument to the contrary is that the US 
specifically chose not to act under the Resolution because it did not want to be restricted. 
The role of international politics dominated the decision of the US to act under self-
defence.222 It could be argued that the US did not want to be constrained by time or a 
particular aim, such as the capture of Bin Laden.223 In this view, the USA wanted to go 
beyond what would be authorised, and further their short term interests.224 If this is the 
correct position, one must be critical of any use of force that went beyond UN objectives 
without justification. Furthermore, ‘the fact that China and Russia could also argue that 
Resolution 1373 authorizes the use of force probably explains why the US has not done 
so.’225 The suggestion is that the US has chosen not to rely on Resolution 1373 for fear it 
could be used against them in the future by setting a precedent. The use of self-defence as 
opposed to UN authorisation is ironic considering the wording of Resolution 1373.226 
The continued use of force, beyond an initial action in self-defence, does not fit with a 
legalistic approach to international law. Perhaps the fault lies in the role of the UNSC. As 
conflict persisted, the UNSC in its role as maintainer of peace and security, should have 
passed a further resolution with clear aims and objectives. Possibly the UNSC feared a 
repeat of the Iraqi conflict, in that a ‘continuing authority’ argument would be raised by 
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those states engaging in armed force. However this could be curtailed by stating a clear end 
date within an enabling resolution. 
President G W. Bush stated: ‘We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on 
terror.’227 It is arguable this is against the UN Charter 2(4) in that it concerns the internal 
policies of a country, however it is also arguable that the Taliban was not a genuine 
government, as it was only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. If as Griffin228  states, the Afghan government under Hamid Karzai was corrupt and 
incompetent, under natural law theory there could be a moral justification for entering the 
country with military force, but this would seem to be clearly in the realms of ‘illegal but 
legitimate’. It is also based on proving that Hamid Karzai was in fact corrupt and 
incompetent. 
Can the war in Afghanistan be a success? It is questionable whether this country is now any 
more stable since the war effort than it was previously. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
there is an argument for the use of self-defence. However in 2014, 13 years later, has the 
span of time become too long for even a moral justification? In terms of legal doctrine, the 
US action in Afghanistan has resulted in the right of self-defence to include military 
responses against states which actively support of willingly harbour terrorist groups who 
have already attacked the responding State.229 This would seem logical, as a state failing to 
surrender known terrorists is clearly at fault.  
The use of force in Iraq it would seem has set a precedent for the UNSC in authorising the 
use of force against Afghanistan. The lessons learnt by the UNSC in using open ended 
Resolutions which allowed states to argue for a ‘continuing authority’ to use force meant 
that the UNSC used different terminology in Resolution 1373 (Afghanistan); however due to 
the hegemonic rule of the USA, this resolution was set aside and self-defence was used as a 
justification. It would appear that the USA is in a position to control international law and 
regulations to fit with its current aims. The USA wanted to engage in the extended use of 
armed force against Afghanistan to capture bin Laden, and hence it created a seemingly 
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logical explanation for it. The result of which has been a war in Afghanistan without clear 
objectives. Bin Laden was killed some three years ago; yet the war is not over. One would 
assume that the current aims of armed force in the region are to restore peace and security, 
but it must be established whether this is something that can be achieved realistically. If it is 
so, then the UNSC would be best placed to legalise use of force in a resolution stating 
exactly what is to be achieved. If this is not the case, the claim of humanitarian intervention 
offers some reason for the use of force, but only in so far as protecting citizens, and 
obviously, Afghanistan is a state in need of more than this. 
Libya 2011 
In 2011 the world community condemned the violent suppression of civilians carried out by 
the Gaddafi regime. In UNSC/10180 the UNSC urged Libyan authorities to ‘meet its 
responsibility to protect its population.’ This represented the new found doctrine of R2P. 
The Libyan government did not react to this request. The UNSC then adopted Resolution 
1973 230 on March 17th which permitted states to use ‘all necessary measures to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ the term universally understood 
as authorising the use of force. Arguably the NATO action to protect [Benghazi] civilians was 
clearly within the mandate; however operations aimed at overthrowing Gaddafi violated the 
mandate and were an illegal use of force.231 Ulfstein & Christiansen argue Paragraph 4 of 
Resolution 1973 is directly linked to the protection of ‘civilians and civilian populated areas 
… including Benghazi.’232 They assert ‘the mandate does not authorize military measures to 
protect the whole population or the entire geographical territory of Libya.’233 
However, if the overthrowing of Gaddafi was the only way to secure a lasting peace in the 
area, could there be legitimate reasons for the intervention, even if in the strictly technical 
sense the authority was not clear? This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Was the use of force within the ‘spirit’ of the Resolution, the responsibility to protect and 
humanitarian intervention? If removing Gaddaffi was the only way to ensure civilian 
protection, then perhaps it would be logical to conclude that it was within the aims of the 
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resolution and hence legal without further discussion. Furthermore, the Resolution does 
state ‘including’ therefore it is arguable that it is not limited to Benghazi.  
The action taken in the country, removing Gaddaffi, whether one would see it as within or 
beyond the Resolution was a success in protecting citizens from an oppressive regime. 
Therefore this use of force would certainly have a legitimate claim, regardless of its legal 
status. It would be the strictest positivist who would not see the benefit in the removal of 
the Gaddaffi regime for humanitarian purposes. Hence, from the cases discussed, Libya 
would seem to have a strong claim to legitimacy without clear legality. 
Conclusions 
The lack of a UN standing army and the Cold War has prevented the UN acting as envisaged. 
Faced with this problem member states have themselves taken action rather than relying on 
the UN to be effective in its role. In Afghanistan, this could be deemed true in the sense of 
realising longer term aims and objectives for the country, however a Resolution was passed, 
and states, in particular the USA chose to ignore it. Furthermore, in Iraq, the UNSC did act, 
and from this act, prolonged, un-envisaged uses of armed force have been a predominant 
feature of the country. Therefore, this may put reluctance on the UNSC to authorise open 
ended armed force, such as in Afghanistan. The result perhaps is that the UNSC must now 
deliver enabling resolutions with a clear mandate and clear time frame, in order to stem 
political interests taking over. 
In some instances it could be argued that state intervention with a use of force has occurred 
because of the political interests of intervening states, their relative hierarchy of power and 
their world visions.234 In the case studies discussed, there are varying justifications given for 
intervention. For a legalist, these justifications would not be acceptable. However, from a 
practical point of view, if state interests lead to an intervention on humanitarian grounds 
then this could be a valid argument for legitimate action. The study of Libya highlights in 
particular where a use of force, which could be termed to be strictly outside legal 
regulation, in fact achieved what the aim of the enabling Resolution was; that is to restore 
some sort of civilisation through the removal of Gaddaffi. Regardless of any underlying state 
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self-interest in targeting Libya, a useful outcome was achieved in the first instance. However 
the present state of Libya is questionable, the removal of Gaddaffi, albeit a dictator, has left 
the country without a stable government. Thus if humanitarian intervention was applied 
universally through a clear legal doctrine, international law could specify that any country 
targeted with the use of force to protect citizens must be left with some element of 
stability; and the state(s) who decide that humanitarian intervention is a necessary 
intervention would have the responsibility for providing that. This would be a welcomed 
addition to the doctrine, as humanitarian intervention cannot exist in a vacuum. 
However, any exploitation of the words of an enabling Resolution, such as Resolution 678 
and 1441 could weaken the UNSC as a forum for achieving compromise. The ongoing 
consequences of such could be catastrophic. If the UNSC is not workable, and states do not 
see it as such, then who controls the international order? This would be left to states 
themselves, without having the UN as a neutral body and mediator. The abuse of UNSC 
Resolutions could have led to a decrease in their adoption. The ‘illegal’ use of force in Libya, 
may be the driving factor behind no agreement being reached on the situation in Syria. 235 
Political realists would argue that it is the lack of any real state interest in Syria that has also 
led to the inaction. Interestingly, in recent months the situation in the Ukraine has taken 
over the interest from Syria. Once again, one of the power five, Russia, has an underlying 
interest in this situation. 
 It would be a sensible conclusion for States to be able to use a realist interpretation 
of international law and apply an extensive approach of interpretation to the facts as they 
perceive them to be. The conclusions on WMD may have been ill-founded, but if those 
predictions had of been real, the consequences of the use of WMD are unthinkable. To 
adopt the phrase ‘it is better to be safe than sorry’ would seem to fit well here. If the Iraqis 
were unwilling to comply with weapons inspectors then the use of force to prevent a 
potential catastrophe through WMD is welcome.  Presuming that any use of force is not 
pure aggression, and is proportionate to any threat, a use of force which is within the realms 
of international law, and is widely supported, should not necessarily be considered illegal if 
it does not fit within a strict interpretation. Where a use of force is not clearly within the 
                                                          




boundaries of international law, and is illegal in a strict sense, can it still have some 
legitimacy if based on humanitarian motives? The next Chapter will consider those uses of 
force that break the confines of international law, and what is or should be the 

















Can legally unauthorised uses of force be considered 
legitimate under certain conditions? 
 
 
The previous chapter established that not all uses of armed force presented are entirely 
legal regardless of the reasoning given by states. Therefore, in considering the justifications 
and excuses states have argued in pursuit of ‘illegal’ uses of force, can or should a use of 
force ever be considered legitimate if it stretches the boundaries of legality? And if it 
possible to render illegal uses of force legitimate, under what premise should it be done?  
Importantly, to consider any use of force as legitimate it must be perceived by other states 
as legitimate,236 therefore it must be widely accepted as appropriate conduct. Usually a 
state embarking upon the use of armed force will search widely for a legal justification even 
if the argument is weak in order to find support for the action. In Iraq the coalition sought to 
base their action on the ‘legality’ of UNSC adopted Resolutions. In Afghanistan, the USA 
based their argument on the ‘legality’ of self-defence. However, as Chapter Three has 
shown these arguments do not always conform to a strict sense of legality or legalist theory. 
Kohen even suggests that USA policy is not concerned with strict legality.237 If this is the case 
then even legitimacy could be a weak argument if the reason for intervention is purely 
national interests. Nevertheless, the USA and any state engaging in the use of force will be 
required to justify its decision to the world community of states including the UN, therefore 
whether legal or not, there will have to be a reason for each specific use of force. 
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If states pursue an ‘illegal’ use of force due to a belief in Council inaction238 then there is 
validity in considering whether it could be termed legitimate action; if the maintainer of 
peace and security is inept to do its job, then states may be justified from a realist and 
practical point of view in taking individual steps.  
It could be argued that the failure of the UNSC to condemn what is, when viewed from a 
strictly positivist standpoint, ‘illegal’ action gives it some legal status not only in each 
particular case but also with possible precedent value.239 If this is the case then the UNSC 
could authorise the use of force retroactively, including armed force which is within ‘the 
spirit’ of the Resolution.240 This view is problematic as it undermines the law. In order to 
follow the rule of law, one must know what that rule is at the time the transgression takes 
place. If this was not the case then it would be impossible to know what the law was at any 
particular point in time. Corten argues: ‘The fact that certain humanitarian interventions 
have not been condemned by the Security Council is testament to the legality of this type of 
intervention.’241 However, not condemning a use of force is not necessarily the same as 
condoning it or making it legal. Perhaps a more suitable conclusion would be that such use 
of  force is ‘tolerated.’242 Legalists would not recognise any retroactive legality and would 
not consider legitimacy as a viable alternative. They would require a form of law to set aside 
the UN Charter.243 However, from a realist and even greater a cosmopolitan perspective, 
there may be some broader justifications or legitimate reasons for engaging in strictly illegal 
uses of force. Hence this Chapter needs to consider possible alternative ‘justifications’ in 
more detail. 
The remaining sections will consider various conceptions and models of legitimacy that 
could potentially provide a justification for uses of force that cannot rely upon strict legality 
for their justification. 
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Legitimacy supported through a creative interpretation and application of the purpose of 
norms of general principles of law 
This model of legitimacy can be related to “the mischief rule” in the domestic UK law of 
statutory interpretation. It would suggest that although there is no specific and applicable 
legal rule to support the use of force, state practice in the area is consistent with this 
intervention.  Those uses of force that were within the “spirit” of international law, as 
opposed to the actual “letter of the law,” would fit well here.  
Dworkin develops the idea that law is not reducible to a system or series of technical rules 
but rather is based upon general principles of international regulation developed and 
applied by states themselves. He considers the view that if decisions are compatible with 
such principles of law, or at least with their implications, then they can be legitimate even 
where they are not directly backed by detailed rules or precedents. Dworkin considers the 
political legitimacy of states as key. ‘International law can help to provide a check against 
states that would abuse their own citizens, or can help compensate for the fact that states 
acting alone cannot solve global problems requiring coordination.’244 In this aspect he is 
taking a liberal cosmopolitan approach to international law. He accepts that the domestic 
policies of states can affect international law and relations. However his theory has been 
criticised as ‘ignor[ing] the crosscutting obligations that domestic political demands put on 
states and the potential that democratic political processes have to use international law as 
an instrument of change.’245  
‘The UN Charter could be frustrated rather than advanced if there is too strict an 
interpretation’246 leading to a lawful non-intervention but one that does nothing to advance 
the role of international law. Kosovo could be an example of when respecting the 
prohibition on unilateral uses of force seemed to be a case of good law producing bad 
results. One example of this type of legitimacy is illustrated through the creative judicial 
deployments of the Martens Clause. 
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The clause was introduced in the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II on the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land.247  
There is no accepted interpretation of the Martens Clause, originally it was designed to 
provide residual humanitarian rules.248 At its most restricted, the Clause serves as a 
reminder that customary international law continues to apply after the adoption of a treaty 
norm. A wider interpretation is that it provides that something which is not explicitly 
prohibited by a treaty (is not ipso facto permitted). The widest interpretation is that conduct 
in armed conflicts is not only judged according to treaties and custom but also to the 
principles of international law referred to by the Clause.249 The Clause is centred on ideas of 
humanity and public conscience. It provides a backdrop of general principles to cover 
situations where strict rules are lacking.  It allows for a greater reflection of human rights 
concerns. ‘Where there already is some legal basis for adopting a more humanitarian 
position, the Martens Clause enables decision makers to take the extra step forward.’250 
Taking the Martens Clause notion of legitimacy at its widest interpretation, in Iraq, the use 
of force in the 1990’s could fit here. The failure of Iraq to comply with the disarmament 
conditions of Resolution 687 could provide a reason to engage in armed force under the 
grounds of humanity. If Iraq was clear in not wanting to disarm, then it could be assumed it 
had the intentions to use such weapons, resulting in risks to the civilian population.  
Considering Iraq in 2003; the belief that WMD were posing a real threat, could lead to a 
rational use of the Clause again on the grounds of humanity. Furthermore, if customary 
action is still to apply after the adoption of a treaty, then the role of anticipatory self-
defence would also be a justified and hence legitimate explanation. 
 In Libya, the use of force to remove Gaddaffi would certainly be met by reasons of 
humanity and public conscience. It was morally right to remove the dictator to enable a safe 
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regime to be put in place. As the use of force in Libya was most certainly within the ‘spirit’ of 
Resolution 1973, it is perhaps the easiest to be regarded as legitimate. 
The use of force in Afghanistan is harder to reconcile with this doctrine. The use of force in 
this country was largely in pursuit of political aims. In a weak argument, the civilian 
casualties coincide with ‘humanity.’ However, these casualties were created by the use of 
force from states; they were not the reason for the intervention. 
Legitimacy through Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (Customary 
International law) 
Humanitarian intervention both before and after the adoption of the UN Charter has not 
gained the status of established state practice to justify the use of force. Thus from a legalist 
perspective it is not permitted action. Though throughout the period academics have wrote 
in support of the concept.251 Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stated: ‘the 
members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall 
consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.’ This is a broad, perhaps 
unlimited standard; permitting the use of force based on states individual interpretations of 
what is just and right.252 In the present day one could assume that the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes is still subject to states individual understanding of a situation. 
If action is intended to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe then it could fall under this 
category. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan cautioned placing legality before 
legitimacy in cases of humanitarian crises.253 Regarding Rwanda, he asked the General 
Assembly in 1999: ‘if, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of 
States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive 
prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the 
horror to unfold?’254 This is a prime example of where it can be argued that an 
overwhelming obligation to forestall a humanitarian catastrophe should outweigh a specific 
legal rule to the contrary. This would seem to be self-evident, if a state can intervene to 
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prevent suffering, then the advantages are obvious; not as clear is the ‘amount’ of suffering 
which must be present. Could the doctrine be invoked to help 10 citizens, 100, 1000 or 
more? 
The situation in Syria would be a good example of a current issue that would serve 
humanitarian intervention if it was an enforceable doctrine. The conflict is internal, 
therefore self-defence is not an option and the UNSC has been paralysed due to the threat 
of veto. 
In Yugoslavia v Belgium et al255 Belgium argued that every state has a duty to intervene to 
prevent human disasters, and therefore every state must have a right to do so. Arguably, 
this is logical in that if states are obliged to prevent human disasters then it follows that they 
must have the corresponding right to enter a country with armed force to prevent such 
disasters. However, the solution to the extent of the catastrophe is still not answered. 
Exactly how many citizens need to be in danger for the use of force to be legal under this 
doctrine? There is no right answer to the question, arguably one life is valuable enough, 
however the risks to the interveners must also be assessed. This can only be done on a case-
to-case basis. 
A similar argument is ‘whether the humanitarian crisis is legally sufficient to justify a 
violation of another state’s territorial integrity on the basis of defense of others.’256 The 
wording is different, but the meaning is the same. Is the crisis ‘enough’ to warrant invading 
another states territory?  
Another potential problem based on the lack of an exhaustive definition is ‘whose moral 
values?’ This must come from states themselves as they are the makers and enforces of 
international law and relations; but if humanitarian intervention is based on what is just and 
right, it could be possible for weaker states to have a dominant majority enforced upon 
them; particularly when linked to states individual interests. Furthermore, evidence would 
propose that the UNSC is inept to deal with humanitarian issues. ‘The Security Council did 
not intervene in Rwanda where over one million helpless people were killed, it did very little 
to confront the Bosnian Serbs during the first three to five years of the Balkan’s war, and it 
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refuses to address the conflicts occurring in Liberia or Chechnya.’257 With this in mind, it is 
easy to see why states may take matters into their own hands when faced with this type of 
situation.  
It is possible that subsequent state practice could result in a new interpretation of the 
Charter provisions that would permit intervention for humanitarian grounds or through the 
emergence of a new customary rule. This would require the general practice of states to be 
intervention when faced with humanitarian crises, and states accepting this as law.258 
Possibly, the second element would fail as states may not want to be bound. However, if 
they do regard it as law; the ‘reinterpretation’ might, for example, require the reference to 
territorial integrity and political independence in Art. 2(4) to be read narrowly.259 For a new 
customary rule to emerge it  would require the status of jus cogens as it would need to 
match the status of the prohibition on the use of force.260 Presently, state practice 
fluctuates; humanitarian reasons are invoked but usually alongside another justification 
such as self-defence or UNSC authorisation.261 This is because states are reluctant to 
establish a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as with the example of Rwanda, 
intervention might then not only be permitted, ‘but a state’s failure to intervene might 
violate its international responsibilities.’262  
‘The genocide in Rwanda was clearly horrific, but Clinton was not interested in sending U.S 
troops to stop it. In fact, [US] administration officials were unwilling to even refer to events 
in Rwanda as “genocide” because they felt this might imply a duty to intervene.’263 The 
principle here is that for humanitarian intervention not to receive criticism it must be 
applied consistently. Furthermore, states can use humanitarian reasons but intervene for 
other ‘state’ related policies; and is the use of force the answer to a desperate humanitarian 
situation? In some circumstances it could be, as seen in Libya and the removal of Gaddaffi.  
However, in other cases, such as Iraq, the outcomes are not as favourable. It could be 
assumed that presently states decide independently on a case-by-case basis when to 
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intervene with armed force. However, what is required is a universal application, regardless 
of state politics. This would ensure that arguments proposed for the intervention are 
genuine. A potential problem is that states may not vote in favour of a doctrine forcing 
them to act when they do not wish to; and if a state does not want to engage in a use of 
force and is compelled to act, it could be possible that it will not undertake to use of force as 
effectively as if it had chosen to act.  Therefore the best possible answer is a defined 
doctrine where at least an element of motivation must be humanitarian and which permits 
states to act if they so wish but does not necessitate they must. 
Just War Theory and Moral Legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy has no real legal basis in international law. It is based on philosophical 
ideals. ‘Realists [would] question the basic premise that morality has anything to do with 
military engagement in the first place and they question that this type of intervention in 
another state’s affairs contravenes the notion of independent statehood.’264  
In thinking about society, in the famous example, it is morally right for one to save a 
drowning baby from the lake, but it is not a legal requirement. There is no duty on an 
individual to act in such circumstances, and this could be transposed into the humanitarian 
intervention argument. Perhaps it is morally right for states to intervene to present 
humanitarian disasters. However, who decides that the situation is severe enough that 
intervention is required? In some cases it might be obvious, but others could be more 
marginal, where would the line be drawn in interfering with a state’s sovereignty? Without 
boundaries, the ‘slippery slope’ argument is evident. It is this argument by which ‘ad hoc 
mitigation rather than principled exception’265 would seek to address. 
It has been suggested that there are three broad categories that could be used to morally 
justify military engagement. These are; response to “aggression,” a pre-emptive strike 
against imminent or likely aggression, and a response to the threats against the lives and 
well-being of citizens of other states.266 Nevertheless these responses should be subject to 
proportionality in response to aggression and the long term and wide ranging consequences 
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of initiating conflict.267 It could be argued that the armed force used against Afghanistan in 
2001 was to protect the lives of citizens, it could also be described as a response to 
aggression. If the findings of WMD had been correct then the invasion of Iraq in 2003 could 
have fell within the category of imminent or likely aggression. One could assume that such 
use of force would be “proportionate,” i.e. response to terrorism and dangerous weapons. 
However, the consequences of initiating action could be more problematic. It would be an 
appropriate conclusion that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are “safe” countries after the 
invasions, and civilian casualties in Iraq have reached 127,789 – 143,066.268 As of February 
2014, at least 21,000 civilians are estimated to have died violent deaths as a result of the 
war269 in Afghanistan. The long term effects of action in these countries would not seem 
proportionate to moral arguments to use force. 
Furthermore, ‘Although moral arguments may be successful in the court of world opinion, 
one cannot walk into the Security Council conceding that a course of action violates 
international law and expect to prevail.’270 It is clear that morality is not law. 
Natural law theory is based on thoughts of right and justice.271 Historically so long as 
a war was considered ‘just’, a country was entitled to pursue it.  Walzer argues that 
‘morality, at least, is not a bar to unilateral action, so long as there is no immediate 
alternative available.’272 This statement in theory would seem sensible, however in practice 
is unworkable. It links back to the statements of whose moral values? Furthermore, who 
would judge that there is not a suitable alternative?  Initially this theory died out in the 15th 
and 16th centuries, however in 1919 and with the Versailles Peace treaty there has been a 
return to this line of thought with the emergence of crimes against humanity and crimes of 
aggression.273  
In order to win support, the U.S invasion of Iraq needed to be identified as a “just war.”274 
Saddam Hussein was targeted independently conforming to the notion of discrimination 
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prevalent in Just-war theory.275 Still, a war can only be ‘just’ if the claims in relation to it are 
truthful. Furthermore, Falah et al suggest that: ‘Domestically, failure in war undercuts the 
authority of political elites.’276 Therefore, once a hegemonic state has engaged in warfare, 
there is pressure to continue with that act, even if arguments to the contrary appear; for 
example, the U.S claimed that they had reason to believe Iraq had in its possession weapons 
of mass destruction. Later evidence has suggested that this argument by the U.S was 
wrongful, but yet the use of force in the country was not stopped on disproving the claims. 
Nevertheless the continued use of force in Iraq was arguably based on defeating terrorism 
more broadly and Iraq’s blatant non-compliance with UNSC Resolutions. 
The US has engaged in the use of force to transform Islamic nations in their war against 
terror.277 It could be argued that this goes against the UN Charter Article 2(7) and the 
preservation of state sovereignty. If this is correct, then how far can ‘moral legitimacy’ be 
taken. If armed force is taken in pursuit of aims such as the one stated above then the 
claims of a moral justification are weak if there is no immediate threat to civilians. However 
this particular interpretation of the Bush regime could be criticised as being anti-American. 
It could be argued that the USA are trying to achieve global democracy and peace from 
terrorism, rather than specifically ‘transforming’ all Islamic nations. 
In R v Jones and others 278 at para. 37 Lord Hoffman in discussing the legal status of 2003 
Iraqi war stated: ‘Many people thought that it was morally wrong and contrary to 
international law.’ ‘Others thought that it was justified, necessary and lawful.’ This is an 
example of the deep rooted problems in the idea of a moral legitimacy. States will likely act 
on their own moral values, which may or may not be universal. Additionally more 
democratic states would likely claim a right to intervene in oppressive regimes.279 This could 
then affect the fundamental principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of 
force.280  
                                                          
275 Force can be morally justified if it can be employed in a discriminating manner. See John Janzekovic, The Use of Force in Humanitarian 
Intervention – Morality and Practicalities (Ashgate 2006) 38.  
276 G-W Falah, C Flint & V Mamadouh, G-W Falah, C Flint & V Mamadouh, ‘Just War and Extraterritoriality: The Popular Geopolitics of the 
United States’ War on Iraq as Reflected in Newspapers of the Arab World,’ [2006] 96 Annals of The Association of American Geographers 
142-164. 
277 Robert Gilpin, ‘War is too important to be left to ideological amateurs’ [2005] 19 International Relations 5, 10. 
278 R v Jones and others; Aycliffe and others v Director of Public Prosecutions; Swain v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] UKHL 16, 
[2006] 2 All Er 741. 
279 George P Fletcher & Jens D Ohlin, Defending Humanity – When Force is Justified and Why (Oxford University Press 2008) 37. 
280 Nicholas  J Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford University Press 2000) 29. 
75 
 
Natural law theory and moral legitimacy have the broadest interpretation of international 
law. At present, these are not legal doctrines in a strict sense, however sensible the theory 
may be. Cosmopolitan theory is the closest to natural law rights, preserving that there can 
be a higher category of law protecting universal rights.  If the doctrine of ‘just war’, morality 
and natural law rights were to be adopted as a part of international law, the use of force 
because it is right to do so would be permitted. This would encompass by default all uses of 
force related to humanitarian intervention. It would be unclear where the use of force ‘for 
the greater good’ would end. It would be pertinent to have a set of guidelines, without 
guidance, the breadth of any use of force could be vast.  
If moral theory on the use of force were to become a legal doctrine it would address 
when to act, when not to act and how to act.281 However the breadth of moral 
interpretations would ensure difficulties in coming to an exact agreement on these 
questions. Furthermore it goes beyond an ‘authorisation’ to act to demanding action. 
Although some crises may be obscene, a forced action is not likely to produce the best 
results. Therefore, the contemporary world is unlikely to see an emergence of a moral 
obligation to act. 
Conclusion 
Underlying these theories is the problem that even if the use of force can be justified, the 
infringement or transgression of the rule prohibiting the use of force remains intact.282 Thus 
none of the justifications discussed would satisfy a legalist. The use of force is still “illegal”. 
This “illegality” would not, however, worry a sophisticated realist, who would argue that ‘in 
international politics states can always find a justification for their actions because the rules 
are sufficiently indeterminate.’283 Therefore, it is arguable whether there should be some 
development of international law to prevent illegal action if it is being permitted. On the 
other hand, if broadened, will the realms of international law be further stretched? It is not 
possible to answer this, but it is something worth considering. 
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Any exacerbation of international law would weaken the role it has, and once it is weakened 
less justifiable uses of force may appear.284 However, importantly, for custom to ‘change’ 
the law, it must in some cases, break the law; what truly matters is state practice. If state 
practice is consistent and coherent, and without a world court to deliver justice for a 
technical breach, it is unwise to label uses of force illegal. Such a label questions the use of 
force, which if used for one of the circumstances detailed above has credibility. The use of 
force should only be questioned when it is sheer aggression, and in such an event is likely to 
quickly receive counter-force by an intervening state anyway. It is states who make 
international law, apply international law, and show respect for international law, therefore 
if the use of armed force is widely agreeable, surely it cannot be inherently illegal. 
‘International law does not exist in the abstract; rather it is what states make of it.’285 It is 
pertinent to note here that state politics may and likely will coincide with any explanation 
for armed force but should not be the sole reason for intervention. 
The Martens clause is a useful tool to make sense of international law. It would be absurd 
for a state which could intervene to sit by and watch mass genocide or similar continue. It is 
also a principle which works effectively in domestic law. Again problematic for this principle 
is the lack of a world court to provide jurisdiction. In practice, perhaps it is one of the best 
options available, restrictive enough to prevent the floodgates of unilateral action being 
opened, whilst recognising the acceptability of the use of force in certain cases. 
Humanitarian intervention could have a legitimate claim, along with the responsibility to 
protect – however, if authorised by the UNSC then the argument is redundant. These two 
doctrines can claim to be legitimate through the role of custom and increasing state 
practice. If state practice is consistent, then it would be safe to assume that it is legitimate, 
if not in the long term, legal action. 
It is also important to remember that threats to international peace and security do not 
always come from states. Threats can come from terrorist groups and organisations, for 
example al Qaeda. Therefore, the UN needs to be able to respond effectively to situations in 
which it is not the state but a group of individuals residing within that state who are 
involved. The US action against Afghanistan would seem to imply that self-defence can be 
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used as an argument to defend oneself against countries that harbour terrorist groups. 
Nevertheless a clear legal rule to represent this would be desirable. 
Action taken outside the UN Charter will clearly be a breach of sovereignty. However it is 
questionable whether sovereignty should be restricted in cases of clear humanitarian crises. 
It is likely the moral argument in support of intervention to prevent human suffering will 
always be greater. What is troublesome is the clear “illegal” nature of what could be termed 
moral action. If states wish a certain morality to be a part of international law, then to 
incorporate it into international doctrine by customary practice would dissolve the 
argument of illegal but moral action.  
 
‘The ‘illegal but justified’ approach seeks to have the best of both worlds where the action is 
justified under act-utilitarianism, but the rule is justified under rule-utilitarianism.’286 In 
practice, states can use force ‘illegally’ without sanction, but the ‘illegality’ of the use of 
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 – including some broad and brief suggestions for reform 
 
When the UN fails to act in contexts where its Charter requires or implies that it should, or 
its actions do not in fact achieve the intended results, then faith in this body may be 
weakened. Therefore, it is essential for its integrity and vitality that the UN is willing and 
able to act in circumstances warranting its intervention. States would be deterred from 
taking matters into their own hands if there was a successful alternative of meeting global 
aims.  
The preceding discussion in this thesis lends to the conclusion that illegal but clearly 
justified action, or what could be termed ‘legitimate’ action, in certain specified 
circumstances should, or at least can, be welcomed. It will also suggest some broad areas in 
which the UN could be sensibly reformed. As the maintainer of peace and security it would 
be unwise for the UN to engage ‘with incomplete and incremental change.’287 The UNSC 
needs ‘greater credibility, legitimacy, representation, effectiveness, and enhanced capacity 
and willingness to act in defence of the common peace.’288 Therefore there will be a brief 
discussion of some reforms that might meet these demands. 
Possible reform proposals 
In contemporary contexts, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect are 
becoming increasingly used as justifications for the use of force. The wars in Kosovo and 
Bosnia were both predicated upon these arguments, and some writers suggest that the war 
in Iraq was based on humanitarian motives. Those authors with humanitarian interests at 
heart have a general ethical approach and a moral vision. Therefore should a legal doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention be developed? The UNSC could develop a system for the 
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‘unauthorised’ use of force to be legal if it meets certain criteria within a humanitarian 
setting. A suggested criterion is: that there is a supreme humanitarian emergency; the use 
of force is the last resort and a positive humanitarian outcome will be achieved.’289 
However, this reasoning is vague as the categories are sufficiently wide to make it easy for 
states to claim this argument. Furthermore, if the UNSC can identify these criteria for when 
humanitarian intervention is lawful, then it would be more sensible for the UNSC to 
authorise the use of force. The use of force would then be under central control, as opposed 
to unilateral state action with a potentially undefined mandate. Humanitarian intervention 
can be rejected by a philosophy of limits: limits on the consensus that exists internationally 
about the link between a state’s legitimacy and its protection and advancement of human 
rights; limits on the willingness of intervening states to engage in long-term efforts to 
address root causes; and limits on the degree to which it is taken in the name of the 
international community.290 This author does have humanitarian sympathies and would be 
supportive of the development of the doctrine. I would argue that the sensible use of force 
in specified humanitarian catastrophes would be desirable. However, it is unlikely that 
states will intervene without political interests and it is impossible to know what the 
dominating factor in pursuing armed force is.  
My thesis argues that if the options are humanitarian suffering or illegal but legitimate use 
of force, then the latter should prevail. In the modern world, individuals should not be left 
to suffer under violent and oppressive governments. If humanitarian intervention was to 
become an exception to the prohibition on the use of force then it could help ensure that 
state practice was consistent, being a universally recognised doctrine. It could force states 
to act. This is an argument as to why states are not in favour of creating an established 
doctrine. What is evident is that: ‘the UN system needs to be ready, willing and able to 
confront humanitarian catastrophes wherever they occur.’291 Humanitarian intervention 
would be a pragmatic solution to identifying and acting upon humanitarian catastrophes. 
A different solution in response to the ineffectiveness of the UNSC to act in certain 
circumstances would be to remove the veto power and replace it with a voting majority or 
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majority plus one. This would prevent states from pursuing unilateral action for fear of the 
veto. It would also create a SC that had the ability to act when one of the permanent five 
had an individual interest in the situation. Furthermore, the adoption of a body such as a 
universal court, entrusted with providing substantive justice would offer an option for states 
to be held in account. The creation of an impartial world court that has the ability to bring 
its own charges would yield confidence in the international system. Presently the 
International Court of Justice aims to settle disputes brought to it by States. An effective law 
enforcer with the role of ‘world police officer’ would allow justice to be applied to initial acts 
of aggression and may therefore prevent or at least deter subsequent “illegal” uses of force.  
An alternative view would be to use force less freely, whether UNSC initiated, and 
encourage non-compliant states to act within the realms of international law by making 
them donate aid or to have more favourable trading terms. Clarity also restricts excessive 
uses of force by removing any doubt as to what is permitted. UNSC resolution 1529 (2004) 
Haiti, offered a clear, limited mandate.  
The UNSC could also retain greater control over ‘coalitions of the willing.’ It is important 
that action taken pursuant to Security Council authorisation conforms to the Council’s 
objectives.292 Therefore, the UNSC must ensure they stay in control of all operations which 
they authorise. An important means through which the Security Council can exert control 
over operations is by imposing a time limit upon them, at the end of which the authorisation 
conferred will cease.293 The UNSC has been burnt by resolution 678 and its continuing 
authority. Resolutions throughout the 2000’s including UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003) DRC 
and 1529 (2004) Haiti have contained time limits at the end of which mandates will expire. 
This is not always the case, but it is increasingly common. However, this only restricts states 
relying on UNSC previous resolutions as justification; it does not prevent the unilateral use 
of force based on other justifications. Developing these ideas, there is a weak argument in 
support of conflict prevention. However, the problem with this argument in that efforts to 
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resolve a conflict often threaten the prospects of one or more hostile parties, leading them 
to engage in acts of violence.294 
As stated by Eisenhower in 1958, ‘you cannot choose between [armed] force and 
law, you must choose law.’ This is the argument central to my thesis. I would agree with 
Eisenhower in the use of force for pure aggression, but in cases of humanitarian 
intervention, I am more lenient. The use of force for humanitarian purposes should not be 
condoned as a legalist interpretation would insist, but instead encouraged through a realist 
perspective. ‘Usually the right thing to do is to follow the law, but not always, especially in 
cases where law and morality conflict.’295 This is a realistic and sensible view. ‘What moral 
value attaches to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention if they provide a licence for 
governments to violate global humanitarian standards?’296 It would be a strange idea, that 
in order to protect sovereignty, citizens cannot expect help faced with a hostile government.  
Against a realistic interpretation is the argument should legitimate, justifiable or moral 
action justify the risk to life of soldiers, when it is ‘illegal’ armed force? This argument 
centres on the utilitarian approach of protecting the greater number of people. Is it for the 
greater good? It must be assumed that there will be military casualties;297 these casualties 
are the most compelling argument against “legitimate” action as it involves risk to life. 
However the risk to military personnel must be weighed against the humanitarian situation.  
Therefore, if the response to aggression is grounded in well-justified claims of humanitarian 
intervention there should be no need to restrict action because it does not have a clear legal 
basis in international law. We talk about justifications for going to war, because the idea is 
that if a nation is attacked and subsequently defends itself, then it has not engaged in a 
wrongful act and therefore does not need an excuse. Its actions are justified.298 This 
distinction is an important one to make. We are not considering an excuse for ‘illegal’ 
action, we are thinking about an ‘illegal’ action being justified or legitimate, it is something 
that is clearly right to do.  
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This thesis has highlighted the ‘illegal’ nature of some uses of force; it has also agreed with 
the argument that ‘illegality’ should not necessarily restrict state action. Action by NATO in 
Kosovo was not only illegal but did not receive any condemnation let alone sanctions. 
Following a liberal cosmopolitan interpretation an ideological approach would be to write 
into international law, either purposefully or through custom, recent state practice. The use 
of humanitarian intervention is clearly an emerging norm, if states are to utilise it as such it 
should be applied consistently and not selectively. If a use of force is ‘compatible with the 
value pattern of the society’299 then it should be termed ‘legitimate’ even if it could also be 
termed ‘illegal’ from a legalist approach. In practice, this author in taking a realist 
perspective suggests that it would be naïve to argue that states would ever prioritise strict 
legality over their political interests. State practice realises this view, and demonstrates the 
importance of states political legitimacy. The case studies presented throughout this study 
evidence that the most often cited use of extra-legal armed force is that of humanitarian 
interest. If the use of force prevents humanitarian suffering, albeit with other political 
motives, then it should not be at least termed ‘legitimate’. The fact that it is selectively 
invoked is unwelcome but not altogether impractical. Of course this restricts some citizens 
receiving assistance but it also ensures other do. If the only other option available is no 
support, then selective enforcement action is the next best alternative.  
International law is based upon diplomatic and consensual agreements between states. This 
coupled with the general presumption that sanctions are ineffective leads to a lack of 
enforcement in international law. This can only add to the belief that states will act as 
realism suggests. History has shown that little if any sanctions are imposed upon those 
states engaging in ‘illegal but legitimate’ action, therefore it would be sensible to assume 
that there is little in the way of deterrence. 
The liberal expectation of universal justice and respect for legality is likely to remain 
illusional or relevant only in rhetoric.  
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